The distribution of UK revenue to the regional and territorial governments, administrations and authorities that spend the money is based on a hotchpotch of badly designed formulae. This is widely recognised. The Barnett formula, which allocates money to the devolved territories, has been attacked from all sides, its consequences described as ‘terribly unfair’ by its progenitor, Lord Barnett. The mechanism by which resources are distributed to local authorities within the English regions has been abandoned by the government, although its replacement has not yet been determined. This paper argues that a common basis for government spending across the regions and territories of the UK will be more equitable and efficient, and may even depoliticise the financial framework of the UK.

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As predicted by Duverger's Law, the UK has had two‐party competition for long periods in most electoral districts. However, there are different patterns of two‐party competition in different districts and more than two effective parties in the Commons. Since 1874, parliament has always contained parties wishing to modify the Union and contesting seats only outside England. By calculating the Penrose power index for all parties in the House of Commons for all general elections since 1874, we identify when such parties were pivotal. We explain various legislative changes (for example the Crofters Act 1886, the first three Irish Home Rule Bills, the Parliament Act 1911) and non‐changes (for example the failure to enact female suffrage before 1914) by reference to the Penrose index scores. The scores also explain how and why policy towards Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland changed and did not change in the 1970s.