The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress: The Case of the Compensation Act of 1816

Distributive politics, the electoral connection, and the antebellum US Congress: The case of military service pensions

“…11 The actual turnover between the 14th and 15th Congresses was 68.7 percent, which represented a significant increase over the typical (40 to 50 percent) turnover levels of the time (see Fiorina, Rohde, and Wissel 1975). Also, Bianco, Spence, and Wilkerson (1996) show that constituents did not penalize members of the 14th Congress indiscriminately, but specifically based on their position (yea or nay) on the congressional pay raise. 12 "DR" indicates that an individual was a member of the Democratic-Republican Party, whereas an "F" indicates membership in the Federalist Party.…”

“…Research on the antebellum era has focused almost exclusively on accountability for position-taking activity. In particular, Bianco, Spence, and Wilkerson (1996) and Carson and Engstrom (2005) have examined high-profile roll-call votes to assess the extent to which members who were out of step with constituent preferences were punished at the polls. They find that antebellum MCs were, in fact, held responsible for the votes they cast.…”

Explaining legislators’ positions on outside income limits: Voting on honoraria ceilings in the U.S. Senate, 1981–1983

“…20 Data is for 1983 and comes from Siegel's survey in McFarland (1984: 53). raise that comes out of taxpayers' pockets, however, it will be harder for legislators from poor districts to justify to their constituents (Bianco 1994;Bianco et al 1996;Clark 1996;Theriault 2005). Following Bianco (1994), constituents from wealthier districts may also be more likely to accept a raise because "congressional salaries are not unattainable" in such districts.…”

“…More specifically, marginal legislators will be less likely than other members to support proposals that their constituents oppose, while "safer" legislators will be less constrained to support unpopular proposals (Ansolabehere et al 2001;Bartlett 1979;Coates and Munger 1995;Kuklinski 1978;Griffin 2006;McRae 1952; though see Gulati 2004). Legislative pay raises are highly unpopular with voters (Bianco et al 1996;Clark 1996;Theriault 2005). It is not surprising that these scholars have all found electorally marginal legislators less likely than other legislators to vote for pay raises, just as they are less likely to vote for other measures that voters see as "pocketbook-padding", such as Congressional tax breaks (Hibbing 1983).…”

Congressional Candidates in the Era of Party Ballots

“…Nevertheless, recent evidence suggests that the quality of individual candidates affected elections in earlier eras (Carson and Hood 2014; Carson and Roberts 2013). When coupled with growing evidence of an electoral connection in the nineteenth century (Bianco, Spence, and Wilkerson 1996;Carson and Engstrom 2005;Carson and Jenkins 2011;Finocchiaro and Jenkins 2016;Rogowski and Gibson 2015), these phenomena raise a variety of implications for existing accounts of electoral politics across time.Our article examines the role of congressional candidates in the era of party ballots. We investigate how congressional candidates contributed to the overall quality of the party ballot and how the nationalization of elections affected the role of candidate attributes.…”