The electoral cost of coalition participation

Hjermitslev, Ida B.

doi:10.1177/1354068818794216

Cited by 18 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…In particular, these parties were in control of the ministry responsible for financial regulation of the mortgage market. Further, while some researchers have found that the prime minister’s party is primarily held accountable for economic conditions (Debus, Stegmaier, and Tosun 2014; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Fisher and Hobolt 2010; although see Hjermitslev forthcoming), recent studies of local economic voting tend to include government coalition partners (Elinder 2010; Simonovits, Kates, and Szeitl forthcoming). However, as we show below, excluding coalition partners does not substantially alter the results.…”

Section: Research Design and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

When Do Citizens Respond Politically to the Local Economy? Evidence from Registry Data on Local Housing Markets

et al. 2019

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Recent studies of economic voting have focused on the role of the local economy, but with inconclusive results. We argue that while local economic conditions affect incumbent support on average, the importance of the local economy varies by citizens’ interactions with it. More recent and frequent encounters with aspects of the local economy make those aspects more salient and, in turn, feature more prominently in evaluations of the incumbent government. We label this process “context priming.” We provide evidence for these propositions by studying local housing markets. Linking granularly detailed data on housing prices from Danish public registries to both precinct-level election returns and an individual-level panel survey, we find that when individuals interact with the housing market, their support for the incumbent government is more responsive to changes in local housing prices. The study thus provides a framework for understanding when citizens respond politically to the local economy.

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Section: Research Design and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

When Do Citizens Respond Politically to the Local Economy? Evidence from Registry Data on Local Housing Markets

et al. 2019

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“…Even within a multiparty context, different practices of executive power-sharing matter. For instance, Hjermitslev (2018) recently showed that junior partners in coalition governments are particularly hit by the cost of ruling. This raises important questions about how voters attribute negative news to different coalition partners.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cost of ruling as a game of tones: The accumulation of bad news and incumbents’ vote loss

Thesen

Mortensen

Green‐Pedersen

2019

European J Political Res

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An extensive body of research documents how governing parties generally suffer electoral defeats. Varying explanations have been offered, most of which touch upon the liabilities of policy responsibility. Although media coverage is generally acknowledged as one of these liabilities, few empirical studies have examined how news content affect government support. Based on the fact that voters get their information about politics, policies and societal issues from the media, this article studies how the constant stream of negative news influences incumbent support over a 20-year period in Denmark. Modeling a previously untested argument on the cost of ruling, it shows that the accumulation of bad news throughout tenure exerts a substantial effect on government support.

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Section: Holding Governing Parties Accountablementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Previous research on the electoral price that incumbent parties pay at the polls has demonstrated a clear link between governing and a diminished vote share in subsequent parliamentary elections (Bergman and Strøm, 2011; Paldam, 1986; Rose and Mackie, 1983). On the other hand, economic voting literature has shown how economic determinants such as gross domestic product (GDP), inflation, and unemployment rates can affect governing parties in either a positive or negative fashion (Hjermitslev, 2020; Lewis-Beck, 1986; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000, 2013; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). Additionally, recent research on the electoral effect of holding a ministerial office in Ireland found that individual politicians who held a portfolio received an electoral boost over co-partisans who did not hold a ministerial office (Martin, 2016).…”

Section: Holding Governing Parties Accountablementioning

confidence: 99%

The cost of coalition compromise: The electoral effects of holding salient portfolios

2020

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This article highlights the electoral effects of holding salient portfolios within a coalition government. For voters, holding ministries can be seen as a symbol of a party’s success within the coalition. As a voting heuristic, parties not controlling the portfolios on issues important to their platforms signal their failure to achieve these goals. Following this perspective, we hypothesize that the difference between coalition parties that hold salient portfolios and those that do not partially predicts the extent of the electoral cost of coalition participation. Using a data set that covers 11 European parliamentary democracies between 1966 and 2002, we show that for junior coalition partners there is an electoral reward for holding their most salient portfolio. There is also an electoral benefit for a junior partner to hold a larger number of portfolios if they do not control their most salient portfolio. Conversely, holding their most salient portfolio and a larger number of additional ministries results in greater electoral losses in the subsequent parliamentary election. These results indicate that parties’ success at negotiating for their policy priorities in coalition governments holds consequences for their future electoral success.

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The electoral cost of coalition participation

Cited by 18 publications

References 34 publications

When Do Citizens Respond Politically to the Local Economy? Evidence from Registry Data on Local Housing Markets

When Do Citizens Respond Politically to the Local Economy? Evidence from Registry Data on Local Housing Markets

Cost of ruling as a game of tones: The accumulation of bad news and incumbents’ vote loss

The cost of coalition compromise: The electoral effects of holding salient portfolios

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