The emergence and perils of polarization

Abstract

We provide commentaries on the papers included in the Dynamics of Political Polarization Special Feature. Baldassarri reads the contribution of the papers in light of the theoretical distinction between ideological partisanship, which is generally rooted in sociodemographic and political cleavages, and affective partisanship, which is, instead, mostly fueled by emotional attachment and repulsion, rather than ideology and material interests. The latter, she argues, is likely to lead to a runaway process and threaten the pluralistic bases of contemporary democracy. Page sees the contribution of the many distinct models in the ensemble as potentially contributing more than the parts. Individual papers identify distinct causes of polarization as well as potential solutions. Viewed collectively, the papers suggest that the multiple causes of polarization may self-reinforce, which suggests that successful interventions would require a variety of efforts. Understanding how to construct such interventions may require larger models with greater realism.

Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts

“…At the same time, there is evidence that ideological and partisan considerations inform the choice of friends, as well as business and romantic partners 218 – 221 . It is not entirely clear whether people are explicitly choosing interaction partners on the basis of political considerations or whether ideological homophily is a byproduct of associational patterns rooted in socio-demographic similarities 59 . This is an important question because the implications for polarization differ.…”

“…There are, for instance, wealthy, nonreligious progressive urbanites, as well as morally conservative, low-income ethnic minorities, and both are likely to encounter people who share some but not all of these characteristics, making it difficult for them to inhabit ideological bubbles 222 . If political considerations become the primary factor driving social relationships, however, people will become much more isolated and polarized along ideological lines 59 . This is because possessing ideologically homogeneous networks exacerbates issue and affective polarization, whereas having a heterogeneous network facilitates the correction of stereotypical misconceptions and decreases polarization 223 – 227 .…”

“…The body of literature on mass political polarization in the USA has yielded mixed findings: ordinary citizens are deeply divided 9 , 31 , 35 , 41 – 49 or they are not 10 , 29 , 36 , 50 – 54 ; polarization poses a huge threat to democratic functioning 3 , 11 , 55 , is not a problem at all 13 , 56 – 58 or the nature of the threat is ambiguous 7 , 59 , 60 . These mixed findings reflect a literature that has been vague in identifying precise psychological mechanisms and how they operate across social-communicative contexts 61 .…”

Social asset or social liability? How partisanship moderates the relationship between social capital and Covid-19 vaccination rates across United States counties

“…Polarization used to be strong among elites, including legislators and elected officials ( Leonard et al, 2021 ), yet less pronounced among the general public (McCarty, 2019). However, American citizens increasingly dislike and distrust those of the other party or political labels—Democrat, Republican, Liberal, Conservative (Alexlrod et al, 2021; Baldassarri and Page, 2021 ). Such affective polarization among the general public, coupled with polarized elites, could lead to increasing ideological polarization and boost the salience of partisan identity during population health crises ( Allcott et al, 2020 ).…”

“…This is the homophily effect of similarity-breeds-connection—i.e., birds of a feather flock together (McPherson, et al, 2001). The partisan identification and homophily seems to manifest group attachment dynamics, including in-group solidarity and out-group hostility ( Baldassarri and Page, 2021 ). The polarizing election, the pandemic and the polarized media ecosystems and information cascades may have sharply reduced bridging ties between people from different ideologies ( Tokita et al, 2021 ) and linking social capital in Trump-supporting regions.…”