2007
DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2007-00032-8
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The emergence of coordination in public good games

Abstract: Abstract:In physical models it is well understood that the aggregate behaviour of a system is not in one to one correspondence with the behaviour of the average individual element of that system. Yet, in many economic models the behaviour of aggregates is thought of as corresponding to that of an individual. A typical example is that of public goods experiments. A systematic feature of such experiments is that, with repetition, people contribute less to public goods. A typical explanation is that people "learn… Show more

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Cited by 19 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…It remains to be seen, of course, to what extent moral self-worth is connected with people's self-assessed empathetic character traits. If it is, which might seem plausible Hichri & Kirman (2007). Open circles, subject 1; filled circles, subject 2; thick line, subject 3 and thin line, subject 4.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…It remains to be seen, of course, to what extent moral self-worth is connected with people's self-assessed empathetic character traits. If it is, which might seem plausible Hichri & Kirman (2007). Open circles, subject 1; filled circles, subject 2; thick line, subject 3 and thin line, subject 4.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In what follows, we will use the evidence from a series of public goods experiments run by Hichri & Kirman (2007). The basic idea of public goods experiments is that each individual is in a group and has an initial allotment of money.…”
Section: Stability Of Typesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…However, Andersen et al (2008) report stable risk preferences when subjects had to repeat the same risk-aversion task at two points in time. Hichri and Kirman (2007) analyze the explanatory power of a learning model (EWA) in a public-good game and find that the model has poor explanatory power at the individual level. Garrod (2009) compares an ultimatum game, a dictator game, an impunity game and a guarantor game within subjects.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The introduction of this parameter allows to vary the attractiveness of the good. In fact, as has been noted in some experimental studies, the attractiveness of a public good can positively influence individual voluntary contributions to it (Hichri and Kirman, 2007).…”
Section: Voluntary Contributions To the Public Good: The I For The Wementioning
confidence: 68%