The epistemic account of ceteris paribus conditions

Spohn, Wolfgang

doi:10.1007/s13194-014-0093-6

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…4.3). One account of them is in terms of ranking theory (see Spohn 2014). Certainly, we find that phenomenon in legal practice just as well; many laws are implicitly qualified by a ceteris paribus clause.…”

Section: Purely Normative Reasoning: a Ranking-theoretic Conceptionmentioning

confidence: 65%

Defeasible normative reasoning

Spohn

2019

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The paper is motivated by the need of accounting for the practical syllogism as a piece of defeasible reasoning. To meet the need, the paper first refers to ranking theory as an account of defeasible descriptive reasoning. It then argues that two kinds of ought need to be distinguished, purely normative and fact-regarding obligations (in analogy to intrinsic and extrinsic utilities). It continues arguing that both kinds of ought can be iteratively revised and should hence be represented by ranking functions, too, just as iteratively revisable beliefs. Its central proposal will then be that the fact-regarding normative ranking function must be conceived as the sum of a purely normative ranking function and an epistemic ranking function (as suggested in qualitative decision theory). The distinctions defends this proposal with a comparative discussion of some critical examples and some other distinctions made in the literature. It gives a more rigorous justification of this proposal. Finally, it starts developing the logic of purely normative and of fact-regarding normative defeasible reasoning, points to the difficulties of completing the logic of the fact-regarding side, but reaches the initial aim of accounting for the defeasible nature of the practical syllogism.

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Section: Purely Normative Reasoning: a Ranking-theoretic Conceptionmentioning

confidence: 65%

Defeasible normative reasoning

Spohn

2019

Synthese

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“…9. In Spohn [2014] I have tried to explicate this epistemic use in terms of ranking theory, which, I argue, is ideally suited for this job. 10.…”

Section: Lawsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causation: Objective or Subjective?

Spohn

2022

Probabilistic and Causal Inference

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We, and scientific practice, tend to conceive of causation as an objective relation characterizing the external world. Philosophy has been more ambiguous. This chapter intends to renew the doubts. If causation is only a model-relative notion and if causation is tightly entangled with notions that are best understood in a subject-relative way, then the objectivity of causation is at least undermined. The paper discusses these doubts and concludes that the objectivity of causation must not be presupposed, but must be constructively earned.

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“…In the philosophy of science Spohn explicates ceteris paribus conditions (Spohn, 2002(Spohn, , 2014 and laws (Spohn, 2005) in terms of subjective ranking functions. Huber (2015b) shows how the statistical notion of modes can be used to empirically confirm the above-mentioned counterfactuals that are defined in terms of alethic ranking functions.…”

Section: Areas Of Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Weirich

2021

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Suppose I am deliberating whether I should live on a boat and sail the Caribbean for a year. This is a decision not to be taken lightly. Many factors will matter for my decision. Several of these depend on uncertain states of the world. Will I be able to make a living? Is my boat really seaworthy? Will I miss my friends? How bad will the next winter be in my home town?1 I understand decision-making under 'uncertainty' here to refer to any case where an agent is not certain what the consequences of her actions will be, or what state will come about. A distinction is sometimes made between risk, uncertainty, ignorance and ambiguity, where 'risk' refers to the case where objective probabilities are known, 'uncertainty' refers to the case where an agent can make a subjective judgement about probabilities, an agent is in a state of 'ignorance' if she cannot make such probability assignments, and 'ambiguity' occurs when an agent can make probability assignments for some states, but not others.12 Risk aversion is further discussed in Section 5.3. Also see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), chapter 6 for more detail on expected utility theory's treatment of risk aversion. 13 This is why von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory is sometimes referred to as a theory of decision-making under risk, and Savage's is referred to as a theory of decision-making under uncertainty. In the former, probabilities are already known, in the latter, subjective probabilities can be assigned by the agent. However, note that, as we pointed out above, von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory can also be applied when probabilities are subjective.49 See, for instance, Wakker (1988). 50 See McClennen (1990) for a characterisation of different dynamic choice rules.

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The epistemic account of ceteris paribus conditions

Cited by 11 publications

References 30 publications

Defeasible normative reasoning

Defeasible normative reasoning

Causation: Objective or Subjective?

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

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