The Ethics of Apology

Abstract

■ On 13 February 2008, the Australian government apologized to the ‘stolen generations’: those children of Aboriginal descent who were removed from their parents (usually their Aboriginal mothers) to be raised in white foster-homes and institutions administered by government and Christian churches — a practice that lasted from before the First World War to the early 1970s. This apology was significant, in the words of Rudd, for the ‘healing’ of the Australian nation. Apologizing for past injustices has become a significant speech act in current times. Why does saying sorry seem to be ubiquitous at the moment? What are the instances of not saying sorry? What are the ethical implications of this era of remembrance and apology? This set of commentaries seeks to explore some of the ethical, philosophical, social and political dimensions of this Age of Apology. The authors discuss whether apology is a responsibility which cannot — and should not — be avoided; the ethical pitfalls of seeking an apology, or not uttering it; the global and local understandings of apology and forgiveness; and the processes of ownership and appropriation in saying sorry.

Acts of contrition: Forgiveness and effective intergroup apologies for historical institutional abuse

“…These viewpoints also accord with the literature and the potential criticisms of intergroup apologies noted above as ‘empty rhetoric’ (Weyeneth, 2001: 29) as part of ‘gestural’ (Cunningham, 2008: 288) or ‘sentimental politics’ (Cowlishaw in Mookherjee et al, 2009: 349). In this sense, therefore, the seeking of forgiveness via an official public apology takes on a ‘pragmatic’ rather than ‘pure quality’ (Derrida, 2001) for reasons of personal or political expediency.…”

“…For scholars in management and communication studies, however, the aim of apology, including within the specific context of HIA, is often ‘crisis’ or ‘reputation management’ (Barth, 2010) as part of ‘image repair’ (Benoit, 2015), rather than forgiveness. Other scholars, particularly in history and anthropology, are also dismissive of the utility of collective apologies, viewing them as ‘empty rhetoric’ (Weyeneth, 2001: 29), ‘cheap’ reconciliation (Marrus, 2007: 90) and ‘sentimental politics’ (Cowlishaw in Mookherjee et al, 2009: 349). In this vein, collective public apologies are prima facie rhetorical rather than relational as they do not require a direct interchange with victims.…”

“… 11. See also Josephides, writing in the context of forgiveness within post-conflict Northern Ireland: in Mookherjee et al (2009: 351–353). …”

Following writing around: encountering ethical responsibilities in pre-service teachers' reflective journals in Inidgenous education

“…It seemed quite tokenistic and one part of me questions this with a somewhat cynical lens". Cowlishaw (in Mookherjee, Rapport, Josephides, Hage, Todd, & Cowlishaw, 2009) defines the Apology as lacking in mutuality, an abject apology. Rather than being tokenistic, such movements ("seductive, feel-good strateg[ies] contrived and promoted by governments"; p. 358) are limited in their ability to be truly "open to the other" as Levinas might suggest.…”

“…To focus on Indigenous students as lacking or in deficit is to continue an assimilatory perspective that measures such students against a "non-Indigenous ideal", and reifies an impossible position where Indigenous peoples are asked to escape who they are in order to succeed by the indicators of mainstream society. As Hage (2009) writes, racism often manifests itself through a racism of exploitation, or a racism of extermination; two fluctuating poles. If exploitation played a role in the building of the nation-state of Australia (for example, the wages that were stolen from Indigenous workers), then a discourse that positions Indigenous people as disadvantaged is another form of exterminating Indigeneity.…”