The EU and Russia's conflicting regime preferences in Ukraine: assessing regime promotion strategies in the scope of the Ukraine crisis

Abstract

This paper evaluates the competitiveness of the European Union (EU) and Russia's regime preferences in their foreign policies towards Ukraine in the scope of the ongoing Ukraine crisis. It is argued that the underpinning geopolitical environment Ukraine currently resides in, wedged between two much larger powers (the EU and Russia), renders it a vulnerable target state for regime promotion from both sides. Indeed, since the 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine, both the EU and Russia have had discernible regime promotion strategies in their foreign policies. The EU's regime promotion has focussed on facilitating democracy in Ukraine, along with more material interests (trade and strategic aims) while Russia has reacted with increasingly zero-sum policies which pursue its preference for having a loyal and Russian-facing regime in Ukraine. Ultimately, the increasing competitiveness of the EU and Russia has been a key factor in the onset of the Ukraine crisis, which offers important insight into the relationship between large powers and the smaller third states which lie in their overlapping spheres of influence.

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“…This study adds to literature on the conflict in Ukraine (see Mearsheimer [2014]; Tsygankov [2015]; Smith [Smith 2015]; Yost [Yost 2015]; Yurgens [2015]; Strasheim [2016] and many others) and a growing body of research on EU perceptions in Ukraine (e.g. Elgström [2018]; ; and others).…”

“…Russian elites were aware of the high chances of Ukraine to sign the AA/DCFTA and considered this step as a threat: this agreement would lead Ukraine to closer ties with the EU and further broaden its cooperation with NATO. These moves were seen as an encroachment on Russia's influence in the shared neighborhood (a number of states that lie between the EU and Russia known to the EU as its "eastern neighborhood" and to Russia as its "near abroad" [Smith 2015].…”

Bingkai Identitas dalam Konflik Geopolitik: Intervensi Militer Rusia di Ukraina

“…Pendek kata, para nasionalis dari golongan Slavik Timur ini melihat Ukraina sebagai negara kesatuan yang terbentuk secara otentik oleh dua etnis utama yang secara historis dan budaya sangat erat sehingga kehadiran masyarakat etnis Rusia di Ukraina memiliki kehadiran yang kuat karena bahasa dan budayanya dianggap sebagai sesuatu yang bernilai (Shulman, 2004). Penelitianpenelitian sebelumnya menunjukan bahwa intervensi militer rusia di ukraina terjadi secara natural karena kebijakan luar negeri Ukraina yang pro Barat (Pridham, 2014;Götz, 2015;Smith, 2015;Tolksdorf, 2015;Casier, 2016;Rieker and Gjerde, 2016;Nitoiu, 2017). Tulisan ini bermaksud untuk menunjukan bahwa konflik geopolitik dapat semakin rentan terjadi apabila negara yang bersengketa justru memiliki persamaan identitas.…”

The European Parliament's Diplomacy – a Tool for Projecting EU Power in Times of Crisis? The Case of the Cox–Kwasniewski Mission

“…High levels of corruption, misappropriation of public (and EU) funds and the use of the justice system by the government in order to target the opposition were seen as the main obstacles to the projection of EU power in Ukraine (Wilson, ). In the background these developments were supported by Moscow, which tried more or less covertly to hinder the EU's policies in Ukraine (Delcour and Wolczuk, ; Smith, ). Moreover, Russia announced plans for the establishment of a Eurasian Economic Space and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), hoping that Kyiv would be one of its key pillars.…”