The Eurasian Economic Union: a case of reproductive integration?

Abstract

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appeared in January 2015 as the latest and most ambitious attempt at reconnecting the post-Soviet space. Building on the Customs Union between Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan (2010), and successfully extending membership to Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (2015), the EAEU not only connects a market of over 182 million people, but has the stated aim of utilising European Union (EU) experience to achieve deep integration in a fraction of the time. Based on original fieldwork conducted in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, this article examines the kind of integration project currently under construction, as well as the EAEU's ability to make a significant impact in the region. As argued, despite early achievements, the EAEU is very much limited to reproducing sovereignty rather than transforming it, marking a clear disconnect between rhetoric and reality. Moreover, when viewed from the perspective of the three 'I'sinstitutions, identity and international contexteven this modest reality faces significant barriers.

Long-Term Comparative Advantages of the Eurasian Economic Union Member States in International Trade

“…However, this process is unlikely to be quick and smooth for a number of reasons, both endogenous that is originating from within the EAEU member states themselves (as observed by Libman [2015], who stresses a lack of any stable pragmatic foundations for deeper cooperation within the bloc) and exogenous, that is coming from the world economy such as, amongst others, connected with their high vulnerability (sensitivity) to cyclical developments on international commodity markets (as noted by Boguslavska [2015]). At the same time, international interest in the EAEU is on the rise not only among politicians or business practitioners but also among researchers, as evidenced by the growing number of scientific publications on this integration project [see e.g., Vinokurov, 2017;Hartwell 2016;Khitakhunov, Mukhamediyev, Pomfret, 2016;Mussatayev, Kaidarova, Mekebaeva, 2015;Tarr, 2015;Lagutina, 2014;Roberts et al, 2014;Vymyatina, Antonova, 2014;Dragneva, Wolczuk, 2013].…”

“…Apart from the EAEU founding states listed above, these are also Armenia (formally since January 2nd 2015) and Kyrgyzstan (formally since August 6th 2015). In Russia's view, the EAEU is to be the next, and this time long-term successful, form of economic cooperation in the post-Soviet area, which will effectively stop potential aspirations of the other four EAEU member states to integrate with the EU while keeping in check the growing influence of China in the region [Kirkham, 2016;Roberts, Moshes, 2016;Popescu, 2014]. What is more, the assumption goes that the role and economic importance of the EAEU in the world economy will gradually rise as a consequence of increasingly tighter cooperation between its member states, which fits in very well with Russia's growing imperial aspirations not only in the geopolitical but also in the economic arena [Molchanov, 2015;Starr, Cornell, 2014].…”

The Rise of a New Empire? Decoding the Eurasian Grand Strategy of Russia and Its Strategic Alignment With China

“…In terms of geopolitical objectives, the EAEU is perceived as ''a response to neoliberal globalization'' (Lane, 2015) related to Russia's intention to contain the EU and the US in the contemporary global order. The geopolitical perspectives of the EAEU unfold within ''regionalism'' and processes of ''regional integration'' (Roberts and Moshes, 2016). To this extent, the EAEU comprises two dimensions, an economic and a geopolitical one.…”

EU Soft Power in the Eastern Neighborhood and the Western Balkans in the Context of Crises

“…7,No. 2 (23) that significantly vary in their commitments to democracy, political freedoms, and market economy (Roberts & Moshes, 2015). Coupled with the weakness of the Eurasian Economic Commission, the bloc's supranational institution, as well as the fact that EAEU members have strong "regime identities", the lack of common values often entails strong difficulties for the bloc when it comes to finding a consensus between its member states (Roberts & Moshes, 2015), albeit it consists of only five members against the EU's 28 ones.…”

“…2 (23) that significantly vary in their commitments to democracy, political freedoms, and market economy (Roberts & Moshes, 2015). Coupled with the weakness of the Eurasian Economic Commission, the bloc's supranational institution, as well as the fact that EAEU members have strong "regime identities", the lack of common values often entails strong difficulties for the bloc when it comes to finding a consensus between its member states (Roberts & Moshes, 2015), albeit it consists of only five members against the EU's 28 ones. While EU Member States-with difficulties, but still-managed to find a consensus on how to react to the Ukrainian crisis, Russia's EAEU fellows not only refused to officially recognize its annexation of Crimea and join its food embargo against the EU, but also tried to take advantage of sanctions imposed on Russia: Belarus, for example, started to sell EU food to Russia with Belarusian labels, which entailed several "trade wars" between the two countries (Roberts & Moshes, 2015).…”