The extensive reflexive literature from many social science disciplines suggests that there are multiple factors that combine to affect the process of research. However, the relatively weak reflexive tradition in the field of political science often suggests some kind of exceptionalism in this regard, reinforcing the notion of problem-free research and the kind of sanitised research ideal depicted in most textbooks. This article draws on original fieldwork notes to highlight some of the problems of interviewing elites and experts in the Russian Federation, arguing that along with a number commonly identified problems of research in this challenging environment, the prevailing political backdrop is also a factor to contend with. In the Russian case, the pressured domestic politics of 'managed democracy', along with events occurring on the international stage, resulted in some largely unanticipated problems during fieldwork which, in turn, elicited a number of researcher strategies in response.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appeared in January 2015 as the latest and most ambitious attempt at reconnecting the post-Soviet space. Building on the Customs Union between Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan (2010), and successfully extending membership to Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (2015), the EAEU not only connects a market of over 182 million people, but has the stated aim of utilising European Union (EU) experience to achieve deep integration in a fraction of the time. Based on original fieldwork conducted in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, this article examines the kind of integration project currently under construction, as well as the EAEU's ability to make a significant impact in the region. As argued, despite early achievements, the EAEU is very much limited to reproducing sovereignty rather than transforming it, marking a clear disconnect between rhetoric and reality. Moreover, when viewed from the perspective of the three 'I'sinstitutions, identity and international contexteven this modest reality faces significant barriers.

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Despite the continuing growth of Internet use in Russia, there remains little systematic analysis of online election campaigning. This article presents an in-depth, multi-method analysis of party and candidate online activity during the 2011 State Duma election campaign-arguably Russia's first 'Internet election'to ascertain the extent to which new social media is changing politics in Russia. The main findings indicate that the Internet did indeed help to level the competitive playing field during the election campaign period, but despite the growing number of Internet users, the overall level of on-line engagement remained weak. Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the Aleksanteri Institute, Finland, for a two-month research stay in 2011/12. during the official 'intensive campaign' period (November 6-December 3 2011). Although primarily concerned with supply-side issuesthe way parties utilised the Internet for their campaignsthis article also considers demand-side issues, including engagement with party and candidate social media by Internet users. The first part of this article provides essential background, including a discussion of the factors limiting or encouraging online campaigning for this election. Part two then examines the scope of internet use during the campaign, presenting analysis of 910 candidates competing on party lists in 20 regions across the Russian Federation. Part three provides detailed analysis of candidate use of LiveJournal and Twitter social networks. The conclusion and substantive argument forwarded in this article is that even though United Russia and its candidates enjoyed a clear superiority in web-presence over its competitors, there was none the less evidence of equalisation, as the online message of the remaining party candidates converged on an anti-United Russia theme. However, while providing a rare platform for opposition to launch, at times, vitriolic attacks against United Russia and the authorities, there was little evidence that candidates were using social networking sites to directly interact with and mobilise the electorate. At the same time, the overall weak engagement by candidates with social media during the campaign period was matched by an equally weak engagement with partisan sites by Internet users. Taken together, this questions the overall impact of the online campaign and raises questions as to the real potential of the Internet to affect political change in Russia. What to expect online? Mixed messages leading into the campaign Although there is documented use of the internet by Russian parties as far back as the 1999 State Duma election (Semetko & Krasnoboka 2003), the fact that user numbers have lagged behind European and North American levels means that research on political parties and the Internet remains largely confined to the latter, although with increasing exceptions from other parts of the world, in particular from Asia (see Kluver et al. 2007; Tkach-Kawasaki; Wang 2010, etc.). In the Russian case, the 2011 State Duma election stakes a claim...

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