The European Parliament's strategy in EU economic and financial reform

O'Keeffe, Mícheál; Salines, Marion; Wieczorek, Marta

doi:10.1080/13501763.2015.1025091

Cited by 26 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Even advocates of the 'new intergovernmentalism' recognise that the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack are an exception to their story (Fabbrini, 2013). On the other hand, other scholars noted that the EP was not very successful in pushing its preferences through, particularly on economic issues (Bressanelli and Chelotti, 2016;O'Keeffe, Salines and Wieczorek, 2016).This article presents an in-depth study of the influence of the EP in the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack.It has both descriptive and explanatory purposes. Descriptively, it aims to provide a systematic map of the negotiations focusing on the key controversies -i.e.…”

mentioning

confidence: 90%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…13-4). O'Keeffe, Salines and Wieczorek (2016) demonstrate that the EP chose to downplay socio-economic issues where it was internally divided to focus on institutional issues. Bressanelli and Chelotti (2016) show that the European Council's active involvement in the reform of the EMU curtailed the power of the EP.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The European Parliament and economic governance: explaining a case of limited influence

Bressanelli

Chelotti

2018

The Journal of Legislative Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

acting [together] in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure'. With the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis, the EP made immediate use of its new powers. The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was negotiated under the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) and, between September 2010 and February 2013, the EP and the Council established new rules for budgetary surveillance and macroeconomic coordination. With the approval of the two legislative packages known as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack, for the first time the EP had the opportunity to shape the rules of the EMU.The literature has provided very different assessments of the role of the EP in the reform of the EMU. On the one hand, the EP has traditionally not shied away from using its powers as a colegislator (Corbett et al., 2016); with its new legislative powers, several scholars observed that the EP's impact has indeed been significant (Fasone, 2013;Héritier and Schoeller, 2015;Laffan and Schlosser, 2016). Even advocates of the 'new intergovernmentalism' recognise that the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack are an exception to their story (Fabbrini, 2013). On the other hand, other scholars noted that the EP was not very successful in pushing its preferences through, particularly on economic issues (Bressanelli and Chelotti, 2016;O'Keeffe, Salines and Wieczorek, 2016).This article presents an in-depth study of the influence of the EP in the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack.It has both descriptive and explanatory purposes. Descriptively, it aims to provide a systematic map of the negotiations focusing on the key controversies -i.e. important issues where the actors have different positions (Thomson, 2011, p. 29). To assess the EP's influence, we compare its position before starting the negotiations with the Council to the initial legislative proposals and the final legislative output. i This is complemented by an account of the genesis of the two packages. We anticipate here that the EP's influence has been modest at best. In the second part of the paper, we 2 explain this puzzling finding. Relying on rational and sociological institutionalism, we show that the more favourable BATNA of the Council could explain the outcome of the Two-Pack, and a norm of responsibility triggered by the crisis could account for the limited impact of the EP on the Six-Pack. Yet, we are not fully satisfied by the extant explanations, and advance a new, additional hypothesis. We suggest that in policy areas close to 'core state powers' (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2013), like budgetary surveillance, the Member States still play a primary role, and the EP finds itself acting within the boundaries that they define. Our policy-based explanation contends that the EMU -and, possibly, other policies close to core state powers -have their own dynamics, where the Member States are still the 'masters', and the EP has a more subordinate position. While we do not completely dismiss the importance of the f...

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 90%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The European Parliament and economic governance: explaining a case of limited influence

Bressanelli

Chelotti

2018

The Journal of Legislative Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The EP has not been an idle bystander to its dwindling substantive powers. Case studies on crisis legislation suggest that it was able to secure procedural concessions in the form of enhanced account-holding powers (Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016: 519-21;H eritier 2017: 14-21;O'Keeffe et al 2016;Rittberger 2014). 1 For instance, the Parliament successfully pushed for the establishment of the economic dialogue, which allows for parliamentary debate on the compliance of member states with the economic governance framework and for political review of Council recommendations and warnings (see Fasone 2014: 175-7).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Losing out on substance but winning procedurally? The European Parliament and accountability in crisis legislation

Dionigi

Koop

2019

West European Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recent studies have found that the European Parliament (EP) had limited substantive influence on the European Union's response to the European debt crisis. It has been argued that Parliament compensated this loss by expanding its oversight powers over executive bodies in the implementation of crisis legislation. This article systematically assesses the conditions under which the EP has been successful in increasing its account-holding powers, using new data on the accountability provisions included in economic and financial legislation put forward between 2009 and 2014. It is found that Parliament has indeed been more likely to gain oversight powers in crisis legislation. Levels of accountability are also higher in package deals and more salient legislation. The findings here provide a more nuanced picture of Parliament's inter-institutional gains and losses in recent years and give more insight into the EP's account-holding role.

show abstract

“…True, the EP has been the object of intense scrutiny in the process of reforming the Economic and Monetary Union (e.g. Bressanelli and Chelotti 2018;O'Keeffe, Salines, and Wieczorek 2016;Warren 2018), and of some attention in other policy areas (e.g. Trauner and Ripoll-Servent 2016 on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; Stavridis and Irrera 2015 on external relations).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%