The European Union–West African sea border: Anti-immigration strategies and territoriality

Abstract

The fight against unwanted sea migration in Southern Europe has triggered the territorial redefinition of European Union (EU) borders and transformed the relationship between sending and receiving countries in the region. This paper focuses on the strategies that the EU and Spain adopted to seal the maritime border around the Canary Islands between 2005 and 2010. According to the primary and secondary data used here, the closure of the Atlantic route that happened in this period was the result of the combination of defensive and preventative measures along and beyond this section of the EU border. Initiatives aimed at promoting economic development, creating jobs at origin, and temporary migration programs paved the way for cooperation among governments, thus making possible the deployment of military resources along the border, the return/deportation of unwanted EU-bound migrants, and the externalization of migration control responsibilities. Cooperation and the mixture of proactive and reactive initiatives seen in this case study are likely to become the hallmark of a new kind of global anti-immigration border that extends beyond the territory of the state.

Understanding Violence against Women Irregular Migrants Who Arrive in Spain in Small Boats

“…The fight against unwanted sea migration in Southern Europe has transformed borders as we know them, as well as the relationship between countries [13,14]. Despite border protection on the outer borders of the EU [15], irregular migration has seen a major increase since 2009, thousands of IMs try to get to Spain through the Mediterranean Sea in small boats [16].…”

West African interests in (EU) migration policy. Balancing domestic priorities with external incentives

“…Several other ministries, such as the national anti-trafficking unit of the Ministry of Justice, also handle migrationrelated issues. Since 2005, Senegal has enforced a harsh anti-smuggling and trafficking law imposing up to 10 years in prison for human traffickers, smugglers and document forgers (Vives 2017a(Vives , 2017b). 8 External actors were involved in almost all issue areas defining the country's migration policy.…”

“…In general, European development aid is increasingly being used to serve the EU's migration agenda. This is referred to as the 'diversion of aid' (Vives 2017a;Oliveira and Zacharenko 2018). Acknowledging European interest in cooperating with African states is crucial when attempting to understand African interests, given that many African governments face an aid-dependency, often following wider postcolonial dependencies (Williams 2000;Ayoob 2002).…”

Regards croisés sur la migration de retour

“…Les pays d'origine n'y ont en revanche souvent que peu intérêt, tant les remises migratoires représentent une manne financière indispensable pour nombre d'entre eux. En Afrique de l'Ouest, les gouvernements européens -par l'intermédiaire aussi bien de leurs agences nationales d'aide au développement que des organisations internationales qu'ils financent -tentent de juguler les flux d'émigration et de faciliter les retours par le financement d'initiatives visant à promouvoir le développement économique, la création d'emplois et des programmes de migration temporaire, sans néanmoins parvenir à s'assurer la pleine collaboration des pays d'origine, tant le coût de cette dernière en termes de politique interne est élevé (Adam et al, 2020 ;Vives, 2017). Face à ces résistances, les organisations comme l'OIM cherchent à promouvoir et à donner une image positive du retour pour inciter les migrants à revenir de manière « volontaire » et faciliter leur réintégration.…”