The Eurozone in 2011

Hodson, Dermot

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02270.x

Cited by 14 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…This was due to the interplay of several exogenous factors, from the EU mismanagement of the second aid package to Greece, to the necessity for Portugal, after Greece and Ireland, to get conditional financial aid in May 2011, to the 'unconvincing' second round of stress tests conducted by the European Banking Association and published in July 2011 (Jones, 2012, p. 89). Institutional reforms in the governance of the EMU failed to reassure the markets (Hodson, 2012), as repeatedly did signals coming from EU summits (Smeets and Zimmermann, 2013). The new European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was established by Treaty in July 2011 with a lending capacity of 500 billion euro, a sum that according to the US Treasury 'would need to be doubled or tripled to provide an effective backstop for the rest of the eurozone' (Geithner, 2014, p. 473).…”

Section: At the Roots Of Implicit Conditionality: Italy And The Sovermentioning

confidence: 97%

Conditionality by other means: EU involvement in Italy’s structural reforms in the sovereign debt crisis

Sacchi

2014

Comp Eur Polit

129

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This article shows the relevance of implicit conditionality in the eurozone crisis, that is, conditionality based on an implicit understanding of the stakes and sanctions involved, underlain by some measure of power asymmetry. The concept of implicit conditionality is applied to the reconstruction of Italy's sovereign debt crisis, and the structural -pension and labour market -reforms introduced by the Monti government, following requests from the European Union (EU). Actual or potential access to EU financial support -carried out through purchase of Italy's bonds to alleviate market tensions on its debt -was the carrot. The threat of having to enter formalized, explicit conditional lending programmes with the International Monetary Fund in order to avoid default was the stick. Market discipline was the operating mechanism that made implicit conditionality effective, and the role of monitoring by the EU was pervasive. Developments described in this article seem to support a revitalization of the fusion hypothesis between EU and member states -at least in the eurozone.

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Section: At the Roots Of Implicit Conditionality: Italy And The Sovermentioning

confidence: 97%

Conditionality by other means: EU involvement in Italy’s structural reforms in the sovereign debt crisis

Sacchi

2014

Comp Eur Polit

129

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“…Parallel to revising the CRD legislative package, the EU has been inching toward establishing a European Banking Union to halt the escalating European sovereign debt crisis and complement the reforms in its economic governance system (Buckley et al 2012;Buiter and Rahbari 2012;Dinan 2012;Hodson 2012). Yet the process has been slow and fraught with disagreements about the optimal scope of regulatory coordination (Barker, 2012;Buckley et al 2012;Spendzharova 2014, forthcoming).…”

Section: Section 52 Banking Supervision Reforms Since 1999: the Roadmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating Banks in Central and Eastern Europe

Spendzharova

2014

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The series maps the range of disciplines addressing the study of European public administration. In particular, contributions to the series will engage with the role and nature of the evolving bureaucratic processes of the European Union, including the study of the EU's civil service, of organization aspects of individual institutions such as the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the External Action Service, the European Parliament, the European Court and the European Central Bank and of inter-institutional relations among these and other actors. The series also welcomes contributions on the growing role of EU agencies, networks of technical experts and national officials, and of the administrative dimension of multilevel governance including international organizations. Of particular interest in this respect will be the emergence of a European diplomatic service and the management of the EU's expanding commercial, foreign, development, security and defence policies, as well as the role of institutions in a range of other policy areas of the Union.Beyond this strong focus of EU administrative governance, the series will also include texts on the development and practice of administrative governance within European states. This may include contributions to the administrative history of Europe, which is not just about rules and regulations governing bureaucracies, or about formal criteria for measuring the growth of bureaucracies, but rather about the concrete workings of public administration, both in its executive functions as in its involvement in policy-making. Furthermore the series will include studies on the interaction between the national and European level, with particular attention for the impact of the EU on domestic administrative systems.

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“…In 2015, he had pushed hard for a more flexible interpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact and in March 2016 he was criticized by Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem for suggesting that France had been shown leniency 'because it was France'. 18 Seen in these terms, Juncker might 16 For more detail on the Six Pack reforms, see Hodson (2012 have been trying to win back credibility by taking a tougher line against Portugal and Spain. Either way, these events, for better or worse, challenge claims that the Stability and Growth Pact entails a rigid set of fiscal rules.…”

Section: Economic Policy Co-ordination: the Eu's Flexible Fiscal Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Eurozone in 2011

Cited by 14 publications

References 6 publications

Conditionality by other means: EU involvement in Italy’s structural reforms in the sovereign debt crisis

Conditionality by other means: EU involvement in Italy’s structural reforms in the sovereign debt crisis

Regulating Banks in Central and Eastern Europe

Eurozone Governance in 2016: The Italian Banking Crisis, Fiscal Flexibility and Brexit (Plus Plus Plus)

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