The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

Zhang, Boyu; Li, Cong; Silva, Hannelore De; Bednarik, Peter; Sigmund, Karl

doi:10.1007/s10683-013-9367-7

Cited by 39 publications

(49 citation statements)

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“…A similar problem arises if institutions are only funded by such a subset (23)(24)(25)(26)37): when paying taxes occurs on a voluntary basis, tax evasion can lead to the breakdown of cooperation (as also shown in Fig. 1).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…At the same time subjects either abstain from second-order punishment opportunities (15), or they may even abuse them for perverse punishment (i.e., forms of punishment that have the effect of reducing future cooperation) (32). The subjects' reluctance to sanction nonpunishers is surprising because second-order punishment is of fundamental importance for the stability of decentralized peer punishment (33,34), and it also plays a crucial role for the evolution of central pool punishment institutions (23)(24)(25)(26). Indeed, in most societies today, central punishment institutions are funded by compulsory taxes rather than by voluntary contributions.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To explain the transition from decentralized peer punishment to institutional pool punishment (22), recent theoretical and experimental evidence highlights the critical role of second-order punishment (23)(24)(25)(26). These studies indicate that such institutions can only persist when they additionally punish individuals who do not support the central authority.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment

Hilbe

Traulsen

Röhl

et al. 2013

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Individuals usually punish free riders but refuse to sanction those who cooperate but do not punish. This missing second-order peer punishment is a fundamental problem for the stabilization of cooperation. To solve this problem, most societies today have implemented central authorities that punish free riders and tax evaders alike, such that second-order punishment is fully established. The emergence of such stable authorities from individual decisions, however, creates a new paradox: it seems absurd to expect individuals who do not engage in second-order punishment to strive for an authority that does. Herein, we provide a mathematical model and experimental results from a public goods game where subjects can choose between a community with and without second-order punishment in two different ways. When subjects can migrate continuously to either community, we identify a bias toward institutions that do not punish tax evaders. When subjects have to vote once for all rounds of the game and have to accept the decision of the majority, they prefer a society with second-order punishment. These findings uncover the existence of a democracy premium. The majority-voting rule allows subjects to commit themselves and to implement institutions that eventually lead to a higher welfare for all.evolution of cooperation | pool punishment | institution formation T he success of collective action and the maintenance of commonly shared infrastructure is often endangered by free riders, subjects who reap the benefits of public goods without contributing to them (1, 2). To mitigate the free riders' destructive potential, many communities install specialized authorities that monitor the subjects' behavior and sanction wrong-doers (3-7). Examples, such as modern courts and the police system, indicate that the maintenance of such institutions is costly. They also constitute a commonly shared infrastructure, which can be exploited just as the original public good that the institution was designed for to protect. Thus, a second-order dilemma arises.Second-order dilemmas appear in various forms and are considered as a serious obstacle to the evolution of cooperation (8-10). For example, in the absence of a policing authority, group members may take the job onto themselves, punishing others directly. There is overwhelming evidence that subjects are willing to sanction free riders at a cost to themselves (11-14), although individuals typically refuse to exert second-order punishment (15). However, peer punishment can have detrimental consequences on welfare, as the punishment costs may override the benefits of increased cooperation (16) and due to the problems of antisocial punishment (17) and retaliation (18,19). Peer punishment may pay in the long run, but only when interactions take place in small and stable groups (20). These restrictions may be the reason why modern states have abolished decentralized sanctioning (21).To explain the transition from decentralized peer punishment to institutional pool punishment (22), recent theoretic...

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment

Hilbe

Traulsen

Röhl

et al. 2013

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…Another line of research, dating back to a seminal paper by Toshio Yamagishi (1986) showed that people are also willing to contribute to a "punishment fund" (think of funding law enforcement through people's taxes) to punish lowest contributors. Comparing (the evolution of) peer punishment and pool punishment has triggered theoretical investigations (Sigmund, De Silva, Traulsen, and Hauert 2010) and is also an important topic of experimental research (e.g., Traulsen, Röhl, and Milinski 2012;Zhang et al 2013). …”

Section: The Determinants Of Social Order Iii: Punishment and Other Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order

Gächter¹

2014

The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis chapter presents some insights from basic behavioural research on the role of human pro-social motivation to maintain social order. I argue that social order can be conceptualised as a public good game. Past attempts to explain social order typically relied on the assumption of selfish and rational agents ("homo economicus"). The last twenty years of research in behavioural and experimental economics have challenged this view. After presenting the most important findings of recent research on human pro-sociality I discuss the evidence on three pillars of the maintenance of social order. The first pillar is internalised norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the behaviour of other people who typically are "conditional cooperators" willing to cooperate if others do so as well. This motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere threat without being executed much. The chapter also presents some evidence on the cross-cultural variability of some findings, in particular with regard to punishment behaviour. The chapter concludes with remarks on future research.

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“…Our work can also guide an emerging experimental literature that investigates how to design centralized punishment institutions to best promote cooperation [45][46][47]. Further theoretical and experimental inquiry can help us understand how best to design institutions that appropriately balance the restraining pull of stability and tradition with the adaptive push of transformation and change.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Should Law Keep Pace with Society? Relative Update Rates Determine the Co-Evolution of Institutional Punishment and Citizen Contributions to Public Goods

Roithmayr

Isakov

Rand

2015

Games

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Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the ability to control how quickly legal rules of punishment evolve relative to social behavior that legal punishment regulates. However, at what rate should legal rules evolve relative to society to maximize compliance? We investigate this question by modeling the co-evolution of law and cooperation in a public goods game with centralized punishment. We vary the rate at which States update their legal punishment strategy relative to Citizens' updating of their contribution strategy and observe the effect on Citizen cooperation. We find that when States have unlimited resources, slower State updating lead to more Citizen cooperation: by updating more slowly, States force Citizens to adapt to the legal punishment rules. When States depend on Citizens to finance their punishment activities, however, we find evidence of a 'Goldilocks' effect: optimal compliance is achieved when legal rules evolve at a critical evolutionary rate that is slow enough to force Games 2015, 6 125 citizens to adapt, but fast enough to enable states to quickly respond to outbreaks of citizen lawlessness.

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The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

Abstract: A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat

Cited by 39 publications

References 63 publications

Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment

Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment

Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order

Should Law Keep Pace with Society? Relative Update Rates Determine the Co-Evolution of Institutional Punishment and Citizen Contributions to Public Goods

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