The evolutionary psychology of mass mobilization: how disinformation and demagogues coordinate rather than manipulate

Abstract

Article published in a special issue on social change in Current Opinion in Psychology. Please refer to published version for citation: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.02.003 Highlights• Violent mobilization is often attributed to manipulation from, for example, demagogues.• The human mind contains psychological defenses against manipulation, also in politics.• Mass mobilization requires that the attention of group members is coordinated.• Demagogues and disinformation can be explained as tools for achieving coordination.• Mobilized individuals are predisposed for conflict rather than manipulated into conflict. AbstractLarge-scale mobilization is often accompanied by the emergence of demagogic leaders and the circulation of unverified rumors, especially if the mobilization happens in support of violent or disruptive projects. In those circumstances, researchers and commentators frequently explain the mobilization as a result of mass manipulation. Against this view, evolutionary psychologists have provided evidence that human psychology contains mechanisms for avoiding manipulation and new studies suggest that political manipulation attempts are, in general, ineffective. Instead, we can understand decisions to follow demagogic leaders and circulate fringe rumors as attempts to solve a social problem inherent to mobilization processes: The coordination problem. Essentially, these decisions reflect attempts to align the attention of individuals already disposed for conflict.

Do conspiracy theories efficiently signal coalition membership? An experimental test using the “Who Said What?” design

“…Several lines of theory within evolutionary psychology have emphasized the social function that false and extreme beliefs could serve, in line with the burning bridges account (Mercier, 2020;Petersen, 2020). Taking as our case environmental conspiracy beliefs, we empirically investigated the hypothesis that conspiracy theories act as efficient coalitional markers.…”

“…For example, the conspiratorial belief that president Barack Obama was born in Kenya has an epistemic dimension related to determining whether this belief is accurate and questioning the former president's intentions accordingly. However, beliefs can also possess a social function by which people signal their membership to a coalition (Petersen, 2020;Wolff, 2019). For example, the same belief that president Barack Obama was born in Kenya does signal that the belief-holder is an ardent opponent of the Obama administration.…”

“…One possibility is to use fringe beliefs , that is statements that contradict common sense or established facts. Indeed, they act as an honest signal of coalition membership because of the specialized knowledge they convey (Petersen, 2020) and the resulting rejection expected from most other groups. Another efficient way to make belief statements burn bridges is by being offensive towards other coalitions, attacking either their intentions or their competence (Mercier, 2020).…”

Information battleground: Conflict perceptions motivate the belief in and sharing of fake news about the adversary

“…Why does misinformation about enemy groups spread rapidly during intergroup conflict? Psychological perspectives highlight the strategic role of rumor dissemination for coordinating group-based actions (Petersen, 2020). During intergroup conflicts, a crucial task is to convince fellow group members to coordinate against the rival group and to persuade third-party actors to join their cause.…”

Disinformation and the Structural Transformations of the Public Arena: Addressing the Actual Challenges to Democracy

“…This indicates that people in digital communication environments are far from hapless victims of manipulation but find ways to socially verify information, if so inclined (Nyhan, 2020). More fundamentally, instead of predominantly informational functions, the use and distribution of disinformation follows other functions, such as the signaling of social belonging (Berriche & Altay, 2020;Douglas et al, 2017;Duffy & Ling, 2020), political partisanship (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017;Bavel et al, 2020;Osmundsen et al, 2020;Pereira et al, 2018;Petersen, 2020;Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018), or an impulse to challenge commonly held beliefs or social values (Altay et al, 2020;Petersen et al, 2018). Disinformation is thus not a driver of social or political divisions.…”