The failure of CAP reform: a public choice analysis¹

Abstract

This paper uses public choice theories to explain why agricultural subsidies were centralised and why this hinders reform. It shows that the Commission is not responsible for the expansion of the CAP by arguing that budget‐maximising behaviour is irrational in the circumstances and that bureau shaping explains its stance on reform. The input process and the success of agricultural groups vis‐à‐vis consumer and taxpayer groups is explained using both the pluralist and Olsonian account of interest group politics. The conclusion analyses the latest difficulties in achieving reform at Berlin and the prospects for reform.

Free-riding on rent seeking—an empirical analysis

“…This seems to be the case as a varying group of indifferent member countries does exist with respect to the lobbying for structural and/or direct benefits. Agricultural support payments are in general a prominent example for logrolling activities: There are plenty of national and subnational lobbying groups that have particular self interests-be it in dairy farming, arable farming, livestock or rural development (see e.g., Pappi andHenning 1999, Elliot andHeath 2000;Nedergaard 2006).…”

Predicting a State?s Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and International Constraints

“…Their pressure appears to have been effective, and the sensitivity of the German government due to the two Länder elections positively affected the societal influence. We may conclude that the German farm organization influenced German preference with regard to the 1988 CAP‐reform (see also Hendriks 1991; Patterson 1997; Elliott and Heath 2000). Domestic considerations turned out to be more important for the German government than international considerations.…”

“…The stabilizers were thus both politically and ideologically costly for the German government. Furthermore, elections were scheduled for Baden‐Württemberg and Schleswig‐Holstein in September 1987, two Länder in which the farm vote was considered to be of importance (Elliott and Heath 2000:44–45). Chancellor Helmut Kohl feared these elections would damage the majority of the coalition parties in the Bundesrat (Attali 1995:426), and he warned Minister of Agriculture, Ignaz Kiechle, that these elections were important.…”

Farmers versus ideas: explaining the continuity in French agricultural trade policy during the GATT Uruguay Round

“…Keeler (1996) and Philips (1990) emphasize farm lobby resources (their extraordinary organizational and electoral clout) and access (biased enfranchisement and privileged access to the government). Others claim that the farm lobby's size, rate of mobilization and preference intensity, as compared to consumers and taxpayers, enables them to dominate the policy process on the CAP (Elliott and Heath 2000). Finally, Moravcsik's (2000) claim that farm lobby pressure effectively influenced De Gaulle's policies on CAP and GATT in the 1960s is based on measurements of farm lobby mobilization combined with the assumption that this will have influenced the government.…”