The Fall and Recovery of the Cuban Economy in the 1990's: Mirage or Reality?

Hernández-Catá, Ernesto

doi:10.5089/9781451846744.001

Cited by 23 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…By 1993, real GDP reached rock bottom with a negative growth rate of 14.9%. Thereafter it recovered somewhat, yielding a rate of 0.7% in 1994 (Hernández-Catá, 2000). The magnitude of Cuba and North Korea's economic recession is furthermore illustrated when considering the evolution of their foreign debt.…”

Section: Gnp Growth North Koreamentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors?

Malici

2005

Political Psychology

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Although the end of the Cold War brought the transformation of the communist bloc, some states have resisted the ensuing wave of democratization. This study assumes that important mechanisms of continuity and change in communist states are situated in the belief systems of their leaders and that the years between 1985 and 1991 were a catalytic period. What did Fidel Castro of Cuba and Kim Il Sung of North Korea learn from the end of the Cold War? Their belief systems are examined prior to 1985 and after 1991, i.e., before and after the collapse of other communist regimes. If learning has occurred, it should be reflected in a comparison of their beliefs for these time periods. Our results from ANOVA analyses indicate that Fidel Castro engaged in some learning but Kim Il Sung did not. This finding is complemented by the results of a MANOVA analysis, which indicate that the end of the Cold War had only a modest impact on Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung, independent of their specific personalities. We conclude by drawing attention to the ensuing debate between structural-and agent-level theorizing and by giving some suggestions for future research.

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Section: Gnp Growth North Koreamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Real GNP/GDP Growth Rates, 1985 Sources: Oh and Hassig (2000,Hernández-Catá (2000, p. 30), United Nations (1997).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors?

Malici

2005

Political Psychology

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“…The robust response of Cubans to the Castro regime's liberalization of policies with regard to self-employment in 1993 would seem to support Gayoso's points. As both Mesa-Lago (2001) and Hernandez-Cata (2000) make clear, the modest recovery from the trough of economic decline in 1993 appears to be due primarily to growth in employment and productivity in the self-employed sector. Hernandez-Cata, for example, estimates that while employment in the state sector declined by nearly 750,000 between 1990 and 1998, employment in the private sector increased by almost 600,000-mostly on small private farms and in self-employed enterprises.…”

Section: A Small and Deformed Private Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, unlike most other societies with an aging population, Cuba's low-levels of income and economic development make decisions to cut back current consumption in the interest of future growth particularly painful. It is interesting to note, for example, that the Castro regime initially attempted to maintain social-spending levels subsequent to the withdrawal of Soviet aid, but it was eventually forced to cut back social spending for macro-economic reasons (Hernandez-Cata, 2000). Moreover, several observers of Cuba's current economic predicament suggest that further cuts in consumption may be impossible (Erikson and Wolf, 2002;Mesa-Lago, 2003a).…”

Section: The Allocation Of Social Service Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and Impediments

Gonzalez¹,

McCarthy²

2004

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“…7 Prior to 1994, more than 90 percent of Cuba's labor force was employed in the state sector. With the liberalization of Cuba's economy, that share has declined since the mid-1990s, but it still employs about three-quarters of all workers (Hernández-Cata, 2000). 8 Currently, only self-employed workers and employers in the private sector are required to contribute to the pension systems designed to support themselves or their workers.…”

Section: Impact On Pension Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and Impediments: Appendices

2004

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operations. 13 But the severity of Ochoa's sentence suggests the real reason for his elimination: He posed a potential threat to the Castro brothers because of his popularity within the officer class, his ties to the Soviets, and his support for Gorbachev's reforms. 14 The purging of allegedly corrupt officials did not stop with the execution of Cuba's most-decorated field general, which had a chilling effect within the ranks of the officer class with respect to expressing any criticism of the Castro brothers. The Ministry of Interior was purged of hundreds of its top officers and placed under the control of Division General Abelardo Colomé, one of Raúl's top generals, and other raulista officers--a shake-up that further ensured the loyalty of the FAR to the Castro brothers. Meanwhile, the líder máximo also ordered the conviction and imprisonment of two government ministers and the dismissal of 13 other ministers, vice-ministers, and state enterprise directors. Surmounting the Crisis of the 1990sThe collapse of the Soviet Union, and the accompanying shock waves felt in Cuba starting in 1991, intensified internal divisions within the regime, causing Castro once again to clamp down on those who dared stray too far afield. The first to go was a tough but pragmatic Communist leader, Carlos Aldana, who was expelled by the Central Committee in 1992 after he had confessed months earlier that he had been a supporter of perestroika until Fidel had made him see the errors of his ways. 15 ____________ 13 Ochoa may have been freelancing when having made contact with Pablo Escobar of the Colombian Cartel, while de la Guardia reportedly was in charge of the Cuban government's drug operations. Thus, both men had been arrested, tired, and shot in order to expunge evidence of the government's complicity in drug trafficking. See the inside account by Fuentes (2002).14 Ochoa had received military training in the Soviet Union and, to Castro's irritation, had demonstrated an annoying streak of independence in running the FAR's combat operations in Namibia. Together with De la Guardia, he had also come to admire perestroika and glasnost, which he had wanted to see emulated in Cuba. According to Jorge Massetti, de la Guardia's son-in-law, the latter proved to be the final straw for Castro and was the reason why both men were executed. See Massetti's memoir, In the Pirate's Den--My Life as a Secret Agent for Castro (2003). 15 According to Aldana's mea culpa of December 27, 1991, "more than a few comrades of ours became perestroika fans and Gorbachev fans" in the 1987-1989 period. But then the Revolution had been saved because "if we escaped that confusion, we owe it to you, Comrade Fidel." He castigated others in the regime who lacked "the intellectual honesty

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The Fall and Recovery of the Cuban Economy in the 1990's: Mirage or Reality?

Cited by 23 publications

References 2 publications

The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors?

The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors?

Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and Impediments

Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and Impediments: Appendices

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