The Fate of Whistleblowers in Nonprofit Organizations

Abstract

What has come to be called ‘whistleblowing’ has grown enormously in the US over recent decades and it is spreading rapidly around the world. The research on which this paper is based develops a sample of whistleblowers from all walks of life and all regions of the US. This article focuses specifically on the treatment of whistleblowers in the non-profit sector. In examining the political meaning of the act of whistleblowing, the author describes whistleblowing as an act of parrhesia. In ancient Greece this was a citizen request to speak freely and frankly. In the case of the whistleblowers, they are moved to speak publicly and candidly, even without permission to do so, in defense of the substantive purposes of the organization that employs them. This study finds that there is little difference in how whistleblowers are treated in the three sectors of our economy. In the majority of cases in this sample, the organizational managers against whom the whistleblowers level claims of wrongdoing, seek quickly to discredit, defame and terminate them. The author’s research does find that most employees in non-profit organizations view their employer as reasonably open to their inputs. Nevertheless, these positive perceptions of the employer are destroyed among those employees who witness what they define as wrongful or illegal conduct on the part of their employer, and particularly where the employee brings their observations of corruption to “higher-ups” in the organization and sees no corrective action take place. The retaliation that too often follows their disclosures of corrupt practices leaves them with a magnified sense of their own integrity, a new political identity, and an indelible sense of distrust toward senior managers and hierarchal organizations in general. The paper concludes with some suggestions as to how non-profit organizations could respond in a more constructive way to dissenting viewpoints.

The Determinants of Charity Misconduct

“…Further work could be done to understand the antecedents and outcomes resulting from investigations, particularly from the perspective of the charities and the actors that raise concerns. For example, Rothschild's (2013) should also be given to the role that stakeholders such as funders and auditors must play in self-regulation of the sector, given their proximity to charities through their day-to-day activities. It is no longer sufficient (if indeed it ever was) to rely on charity status to convey trust and inspire confidence in the conduct of an organization.…”

“…These dimensions have received some attention in the nonprofit occupational fraud literature (e.g. Rothschild, 2013). …”

Why so few acting whistleblowers? Impacts of institutional anticorruption

“…Whistleblowing against government corruption is a form of “grievances against the state,” which receives little support from either governments or civil society, as survival of grassroots NGOs first conditions on refraining from fueling grievances against the state (Spires, , p. 1). Studies further show that more than half whistleblowers received various kinds of punishment, ranging from retaliatory practices, loss of jobs, and even to loss of their lives (Liyanarachchi & Newdick, ; Rehg et al, ; Rothschild, ). The prospects that whistleblowers are legally protected in China are at best dismal, particularly when whistleblowing targets at governmental agencies.…”

“…Incentivized behavior is arguably due to information availability (Anderson & Holt, 1996. By watching the acts from fellow citizens, individuals draw rational inferences with limited information (Banerjee, 1992), particularly keen to do so when the stakes are high such as whistleblowing acts (Rothschild, 2013). Studies suggest that corruption is contagious (Becker, Egger, & Seidel, 2009;Darley, 2004;Hasty, 2005) and by the same token, whistleblowing may also be a learned strategy against corruption.…”

Mental Heath as a Weapon: Whistleblower Retaliation and Normative Violence

“…Potential sources of power for the whistleblower include their perceived legitimacy, e.g., through possessing a senior role, or a position in which whistleblowing is 'mandated' such as an audit or compliance function (Miceli et al 1999;Rehg et al 2008), and support from others within the organization (Miceli et al 1999). These decrease the likelihood of retaliation, while perceived threats to the power 'resource' of the wrongdoer are likely to increase it (Rehg et al 2008), for example where their actions involve potential harm to the public (Near and Jensen 1993), where the legitimacy (Miethe 1999) or future performance (Miceli and Near 2002) of the organization is being threatened or where an external reporting channel is used (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 2005;Rothschild 2013). If, on the other hand, the wrongdoing is such that it has become systemic to the organization (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 2005), for example as part of its culture or climate , retaliation is more likely to occur.…”