The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment

Cramton, Peter

doi:10.1162/105864097567165

Cited by 203 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In practice, activity rules appear to be important, because of the more detailed knowledge bidders have about the preferences of others and hence a better sense of the benefits of deviating from straightforward bidding. The first U.S. broadband auction is a good example of an auction where the activity rule played an important role (McAfee and McMillan 1996;Cramton 1997). …”

Section: Improving Price Discoverymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

Ausubel¹,

Cramton²,

Milgrom³

2005

Combinatorial Auctions

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We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear pricing is maintained as long as possible, but then is abandoned in the proxy round to improve efficiency and enhance seller revenues. The approach has many advantages over the simultaneous ascending auction. In particular, the clock-proxy auction has no exposure problem, eliminates incentives for demand reduction, and prevents most collusive bidding strategies.

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Section: Improving Price Discoverymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

Ausubel¹,

Cramton²,

Milgrom³

2005

Combinatorial Auctions

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“…The details of the auctions are provided in Cramton (1997) and McAfee and McMillan (1996). We confine ourselves here to a discussion of the features of the auction outcomes salient for our investigation of local synergies.…”

Section: The Bid Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This may be preferable, since cellular holdings and any associated synergies are ex ante observable, whereas PCS holdings are endogenously determined at auction. However, even well before the end of the auction, the ascending-bid design reveals to bidders accurate information about who is likely to win what (Cramton 1997). Hence, this distinction between PCS and cellular holdings may not be too important.…”

Section: Synergiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We define global synergies as those gains in value which accrue from obtaining increased numbers of licenses or markets: economies of scale or scope among multiple licenses which arise irrespective of their geographic locations. 3 1 On the form of the auctions, see Cramton (1997) and McAfee and McMillan (1996). The AB auction, which began on December 5, 1994 and ended on March 13, 1995, offered two 30 MHz licenses (blocks A and B) in each of 51 geographic areas known as major trading areas, or MTAs, minus three licenses already awarded under a pioneer preference, for a total of 99 licenses for sale.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions

Ausubel¹,

Cramton²,

McAfee³

et al. 1997

Economics Manag Strategy

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We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices.Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies in an ascending-bid auction, prices were higher when the highest-losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they were often successful in realizing these synergies. JEL No.: D44 (Auctions), L96 (Telecommunications)

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“…Combinatorial auctions have been used in the procurement of London bus routes (Cantillon and Pesendorfer [8]), radio spectrum (Cramton [12]), and truckload transportation (Caplice and Sheffi [9]), among many others. Combinatorial auctions arise in situations where bidders are interested in buying bundles of objects that inherit some level of synergies among themselves.…”

Section: The Winner Determination Problem In Combinatorial Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A fast approximation algorithm for solving the complete set packing problem

Nguyen

2014

European Journal of Operational Research

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We study the complete set packing problem (CSPP) where the family of feasible subsets may include all possible combinations of objects. This setting arises in applications such as combinatorial auctions (for selecting optimal bids) and cooperative game theory (for finding optimal coalition structures). Although the set packing problem has been well-studied in the literature, where exact and approximation algorithms can solve very large instances with up to hundreds of objects and thousands of feasible subsets, these methods are not extendable to the CSPP since the number of feasible subsets is exponentially large. Formulating the CSPP as an MILP and solving it directly, using CPLEX for example, is impossible for problems with more than 20 objects. We propose a new mathematical formulation for the CSPP that directly leads to an efficient algorithm for finding feasible set packings (upper bounds). We also propose a new formulation for finding tighter lower bounds compared to LP relaxation and develop an efficient method for solving the corresponding large-scale MILP. We test the algorithm with the winner determination problem in spectrum auctions, the coalition structure generation problem in coalitional skill games, and a number of other simulated problems that appear in the literature.

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The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment

Cited by 203 publications

References 8 publications

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions

A fast approximation algorithm for solving the complete set packing problem

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