The literature suggests that state capacity has a reinforcing effect on democracy. According to this literature, the capacity and usability of the bureaucracy that state capacity entails are essential for the provision of goods and services that help to consolidate and improve democratic regimes. This paper challenges this proposition. It focuses on local democracy and draws on the comparative method to describe and evaluate how bureaucratic capacity and usability can affect a critical component of democracy-the horizontal (or intrastate) oversight on the executive. Contrasting with the literature, this paper argues that, even in democratic regimes, state capacity can discourage accountability agents that are elected through popular vote. As the results show, bureaucracies that are well funded, highly professionalized, and usable give local executives an ample capacity to discourage accountability agents (municipal councils) from holding them accountable. Local bureaucracies with these characteristics can isolate municipal councils from local communities, strip them from autonomous constituent support, and render council members electorally dependent on the mayor. When local bureaucracies lack these characteristics, executives can still manage to influence horizontal accountability by exchanging council members' support for access to municipal resources they can distribute to increase their constituent support. Municipal councils' inclination towards accountability is, however, greater when local bureaucracies are highly capable but not usable. In this case, the local executive lacks influence on council members' relationship with local communities and, therefore, on municipal councils' disposition to hold them accountable.