The Feeling of Sincerity

Gregory, Daniel

doi:10.1002/tht3.391

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Some theories are consistent with the claim that there is a phenomenological difference between making sincere assertions and making insincere assertions generally; some are not. Gregory (2018) presents us with these cases involving Candice, expecting us to agree that the quality of Cameron's experience of asserting in the two cases would be different, and taking himself to have provided us some reason to accept a theory about the phenomenology of assertion that is consistent with the claim that there is a phenomenological difference between making sincere assertions and making insincere assertions generally.…”

Section: Examplementioning

confidence: 94%

Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think)

Andow

2020

Inquiry

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Much recent work on philosophical methodology has focused on whether we should accept : the claim that philosophers use intuitive judgments about cases as evidence for/against philosophical theories. This paper outlines a new way of thinking about the philosophical method of appealing to cases such that is true but not as it is typically understood. The idea proposed is that, when philosophers appeal to cases, they are engaged in a project of conceptual engineering and that, within that project, intuitions about cases provide evidence as to the normative constraints which are relevant within that project. The paper demonstrates that this is a feasible interpretation of the way that cases are appealed to in recent journal issues, and makes the case that this would be a better way to think of what philosophers are doing when they appeal to cases.

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Section: Examplementioning

confidence: 94%

Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think)

Andow

2020

Inquiry

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“…The idea here is that, while inner speech may not be necessary simply for having thoughts of a particular kind, it is the primary means by which we are able to internally reflect upon—and become conscious of—those thoughts. This awareness is hypothesized to allow for reflection upon the logical or inferential properties that hold among thoughts (Bermudez, 2003; Clark, 1998), or to serve as data for feats of self‐interpretation about one's other mental states (Carruthers, 2011; Gregory, 2018). Empirical support for these theoretical proposals remains relatively indirect (see Carruthers [2011] and Morin (2018) for reviews).…”

Section: The Functions Of Inner Speechmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inner speech

Langland‐Hassan

2020

WIRES Cognitive Science

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Inner speech travels under many aliases: the inner voice, verbal thought, thinking in words, internal verbalization, “talking in your head,” the “little voice in the head,” and so on. It is both a familiar element of first‐person experience and a psychological phenomenon whose complex cognitive components and distributed neural bases are increasingly well understood. There is evidence that inner speech plays a variety of cognitive roles, from enabling abstract thought, to supporting metacognition, memory, and executive function. One active area of controversy concerns the relation of inner speech to auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) in schizophrenia, with a common proposal being that sufferers of AVH misidentify their own inner speech as being generated by someone else. Recently, researchers have used artificial intelligence to translate the neural and neuromuscular signatures of inner speech into corresponding outer speech signals, laying the groundwork for a variety of new applications and interventions. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Linguistics > Language in Mind and Brain Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Psychological Capacities

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How not to decide whether inner speech is speech: Two common mistakes

Gregory

2022

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Philosophical interest in inner speech has grown in recent years. In seeking to understand the phenomenon, many philosophers have drawn heavily on two theories from neighbouring disciplines: Lev Vygotsky’s theory on the development of inner speech in children and a cognitive-scientific theory about speech production. I argue that they have been too uncritical in their acceptance of these theories, which has prevented a proper analysis of inner speech.

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The Feeling of Sincerity

Cited by 5 publications

References 40 publications

Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think)

Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think)

Inner speech

How not to decide whether inner speech is speech: Two common mistakes

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