The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Simulation Hypothesis

Mizrahi, Moti

doi:10.1017/s1477175617000094

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…The view also forces us to reject the possibility that someone might be sentient and deeply uninterpretable. 16 The simulation hypothesis has been subsequently explored or defended by multiple philosophers and physicists, including Arvan (2014Arvan ( , 2015, Beane et al (2012), Campbell et al (2017, Dainton (2002Dainton ( , 2012, Johnson (2011), andMizrahi (2017). 17 Barry Dainton suggests something along these lines (2002,2012) 18 There are, of course, many other strategies of defusing solipsism.…”

Section: E N D N O T E Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism

Helton¹

2021

Philosophical Perspectives

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Section: E N D N O T E Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism

Helton¹

2021

Philosophical Perspectives

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“… Mizrahi's (2017) simulation hypothesis, according to which we live in a computer simulation designed by non‐supernatural agents, similar to us. Where did these agents come from?…”

Section: The Sceptical Response To Ftamentioning

confidence: 99%

Fine‐tuning, weird sorts of atheism and evidential favouring

Tokhadze

2021

Philosophical Books

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This paper defends a novel sceptical response to the fine‐tuning argument for the existence of God (FTA). According to this response, even if FTA can establish, what I call, the confirmation proposition: ‘fine‐tuning confirms the God hypothesis’, there is no reason to think that a strengthening of FTA can establish the evidence‐favouring proposition: ‘fine‐tuning favours the God hypothesis over its competitors’. My argument is that, any criteria for the explanation of fine‐tuning that permit us to take the God hypothesis seriously ought to make us sceptical that fine‐tuning favours the God hypothesis over its competitors. As taking the God hypothesis seriously requires us to give a fair hearing to all sorts of non‐theistic explanations, including the so‐called weird sorts of atheism.

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“…Other theorists argue that versions of the simulation hypothesis may explain features of fundamental physics, such as quantum phenomena [Whitworth 2008;Arvan 2014], relativistic physics [Whitworth 2008[Whitworth , 2010, or cosmological fine-tuning [Mizrahi 2017].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments

Summers

Arvan

2021

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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Various theorists contend that we may live in a computer simulation. David Chalmers in turn argues that the simulation hypothesis is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of our reality, rather than a sceptical scenario. We use recent work on consciousness to motivate new doubts about both sets of arguments. First, we argue that if either panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then the only way to live in a simulation may be as brains-in-vats, in which case it is unlikely that we live in a simulation. We then argue that if panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then viable simulation hypotheses are substantially sceptical scenarios.We conclude that the nature of consciousness has wide-ranging implications for simulation arguments.

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The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Simulation Hypothesis

Cited by 6 publications

References 17 publications

Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism

Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism

Fine‐tuning, weird sorts of atheism and evidential favouring

Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments

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