The Flicker of Freedom: A Reply to Stump

Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck

“…This is in line with what most of the advocates of the Triple O view explicitly say. For example, Capes and Swenson identify the claim that the agent makes the decision on her own with “an observation about the etiology of [the agent's] decision, viz., that it was not the result of outside coercion or force” (Capes and Swenson : 978; see also Capes : 433). And Robinson says that what it means to say that an agent decides on his own to A is “simply that he decides to A and that he does so without being causally forced or interfered with” (Robinson Forthcoming: n. 31).…”

“…Eleonore Stump suggests that the Triple O view could only work if doing an act on one's own were an act, and one that is different from the act that the agent would have performed otherwise (she is skeptical of these assumptions). For a response to Stump, see Capes (2014). There are some views according to which we can be basically responsible for things like character traits or mental states that are not acts (see, e.g., Adams 1985, Smith 2005, and Graham 2014.…”

Frankfurt cases: the fine-grained response revisited

“…But once we clearly distinguish these two versions of the flicker strategy, we can see that Stump's criticism of the flicker strategy has no force against the fine-grained version of the strategy, as that version does not turn on what she regards as the implausible assumption that doing an act-on-one's-own is a distinct action. For further discussion of this issue, see Capes (2014).…”

Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to do Otherwise

“…Compatibilists, however, will have to suppose otherwise-for there is (plausibly) no difference between someone's actions having been "set up" in the relevant way by Diana or 1 PAP, of course, has famously been called into question by the so-called "Frankfurt examples". But the jury on such examples is still out; see, e.g., Franklin (2011), Capes (2014, and Swenson (2015) for recent replies to the Frankfurt cases. The present paper highlights the importance of the denial of PAP for compatibilist theories of moral responsibility.…”

“… PAP, of course, has famously been called into question by the so‐called “Frankfurt examples”. But the jury on such examples is still out; see, e.g., Franklin (), Capes (), and Swenson () for recent replies to the Frankfurt cases. The present paper highlights the importance of the denial of PAP for compatibilist theories of moral responsibility. …”