r 2005
DOI: 10.20955/r.87.93-101
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The FOMC: Preferences, Voting, and Consensus

Abstract: The total number of possible responses was 1,225, reflecting the total number of FOMC meetings attended by 35 policymakers over the sample period. 1 0 1 19 Thornton and Wheelock (2000) suggest that the Chairman has more leeway to adjust interest rates during the intermeeting period under an asymmetric directive than under a symmetric directive.

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Cited by 67 publications
(86 citation statements)
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“…Obviously, measuring policy preferences on an individual level is difficult. Here we utilize the data set constructed by Meade (2005). 10 She uses transcripts of FOMC meetings and codes verbally stated preferences into a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a member favors tighter policy, -1 in case of policy easing and zero otherwise.…”
Section: Empirical Strategy and Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Obviously, measuring policy preferences on an individual level is difficult. Here we utilize the data set constructed by Meade (2005). 10 She uses transcripts of FOMC meetings and codes verbally stated preferences into a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a member favors tighter policy, -1 in case of policy easing and zero otherwise.…”
Section: Empirical Strategy and Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although Chairman Greenspan was in office from 11 August 1987 to 31 January 2006, the present analysis focuses on the sample ranging from the first meeting in 1989 to the first meeting in 2006. Greenbook forecasts for inflation, GDP and unemployment and data on individual interest rate preferences from the FOMC's policy go-around are available for this sample period (see Meade, 2005). In addition, individual forecasts of FOMC members (see Romer, 2010) are currently available for the subsample ranging from 1992 to the end of 2002.…”
Section: Non-technical Summarymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This question is interesting, because it has been argued that preferences of Reserve Bank Presidents are more persistent than those of the Governors (Meade, 2005). In addition, "while the Reserve Bank Presidents are not part of the pre-meeting discussions at the Board, they have their own devices for influencing the policy discussions in between the meetings.…”
Section: Non-technical Summarymentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…report that dissents represent 7.8 percent of voting observations over the 1966-96 period. According to Meade (2005), however, the FOMC's internal rates of disagreement are quite similar to dissent rates at the Bank of England, if one looks at opinions expressed during the discussion of policy proposals. decision power.…”
Section: Leader Dominance and Dissent In Monetary Policy Committeesmentioning
confidence: 99%