The Free Aceh Movement: Islam and democratisation 1

Kingsbury, Damien

doi:10.1080/00472330701253759

Cited by 25 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Neither party wished to be viewed as having taking actions that at best prevented the most effective disaster response and at worst even added to the magnitude of human suffering. Each party had been vying for the support of the population, with GAM espousing nationalist motivations for the rebellion and the GOI advocating a more fundamentalist Islamic practice for the population (Kingsbury 2007a).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both of the insurgent movements studied here have at one time sought secession. Both the MILF and GAM based their claim on historical evidence suggesting that the conquest, respectively, of the territory in the Philippines and Indonesia that the movements now claim as their “homeland” was indeed illegitimate (Gershman 2001; Kingsbury 2007a).…”

Section: Theoretical Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Acehnese population believed it had achieved a degree of territorial control, if not outright sovereignty, in the precolonial period over what is today the northernmost province of Indonesia on the island of Sumatra (Bacani 2006; Kingsbury 2007a, 2007b; Barnes 2009). While petitions for autonomy to the governments of President Sukarno and President Suharto were initially given sober consideration, neither government followed through with concrete positive steps in the direction of autonomy (Schulze 2007a).…”

Section: Indonesiamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Law no. 24/1956 granted Aceh the status of “special territory,” and in 1959 the national government had designated Aceh as having a “special administrative” status (Kingsbury 2007a).…”

Section: Intervention Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coming to Terms with Separatist Insurgencies

Harris

2010

Negotiation Journal

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Although insurgencies may begin their rebellions with expressed desires for outcomes unacceptable to opposing governments, the desired insurgent outcomes sometimes undergo modification, creating conditions that can make governments more amenable to external mediation. In certain separatist conflicts, the likelihood of external mediation increases when the political redefinition of the state insisted upon by the insurgents undergoes a revision, from secession to self‐determination, understood as a variant of autonomy. In the same vein, although it may not happen concurrently, insurgent movements become more amenable to external mediation if and when opposing governments revise the preferred conflict outcome from a military defeat of the insurgents to a containment of the movement. These two developments can serve as objective referents helping external parties to identify a ripe moment in the conflict and initiate mediation. But the implementation of an agreement ending separatist conflict may not occur if the government fails to submit the proposed territorial bounds of autonomy to prior review by constituents. Potential spoilers among government constituents should be identified and recruited to participate in the negotiations so that the likelihood of agreement rejection is reduced. In some states, however, the legal mechanisms and political opportunities for constituents to act as spoilers do not exist.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Indonesiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Intervention Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coming to Terms with Separatist Insurgencies

Harris

2010

Negotiation Journal

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“…Kingsbury, among other scholars, has noted the change over time, in that the “distance that has grown between GAM and any formal political commitment to Islam” (2007:174). He identifies the split between some of the original GAM members and de Tiro over “the distinction between a local nationalist revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Aceh as part of a larger Islamic federation” (Kingsbury :174) as a turning point, noting that it “was from this time that GAM's identification as a purely nationalist organization that rejected the establishment of an Islamic state became clearly pronounced” (Kingsbury :174). Hence, the originally stated demands for an Islamic independent state shifted over time and the ideological orientations of nationalism and human rights came in the forefront of the struggle for Aceh.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%