Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe 2019
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2_3
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The French-German Military Cooperation and the Revival of European Defence After Brexit: Between Reality and Political Myth

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Cited by 11 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…in an increase of operating costs) may contribute to decrease in their competitiveness, operating costs may exceed the current margins. The Brexit will also have consequences on EU and transport markets functioning (see Fouskas, Gökay 2019;Deschaux-Dutard, 2019). The common transport policy is a consequence of the integration of individual EU member state economies, which enforces and accelerates the processes of business internationalisation.…”
Section: Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issuesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…in an increase of operating costs) may contribute to decrease in their competitiveness, operating costs may exceed the current margins. The Brexit will also have consequences on EU and transport markets functioning (see Fouskas, Gökay 2019;Deschaux-Dutard, 2019). The common transport policy is a consequence of the integration of individual EU member state economies, which enforces and accelerates the processes of business internationalisation.…”
Section: Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issuesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, without the UK, Italy understood that its leverage within the EU was at stake: it would lose an important ally to rely upon in its search for support vis-à-vis larger European countries such as France and Germany (Carbone et al 2011). Moreover, Paris and Berlin took their cooperation forward, both bilaterally and in the EU (Kempin and Kunz 2017;Deschaux-Dutard 2019).…”
Section: Between France and Germany: Italy's European Foreign Policy ...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The European Economic Community/European Union was born as an economy-oriented organization, which was to facilitate rebuilding of the Old Continent after WWII through extensive cooperation, particularly in trade� However, the appetites of the state leaders were growing along the progress of the integration processes; the economic success was an argument for further integration of the European countries� Due to this, the organization was given the ability to make decisions and influence decision-makers at the national level in subsequent spheres that earlier were the sole prerogative of states� Still, for many years EU members determinedly guarded their competences regarding broadly understood security, predominantly defence� Successive attempts to accelerate integration in this area were not effective enough to develop a real common defence policy� One of the last initiatives, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), is supposed to help change this situation� It is -ABSTRAKT -Wspólnota Europejska/Unia Europejska zrodziła się jako organizacja ekonomiczna, która poprzez pogłębioną współpracę, zwłaszcza handlową, pozwolić miała na szybką odbudowę Starego Kontynentu ze zgliszczy wojennych� Apetyty przywódców państw europejskich rosły jednak w miarę postępujących procesów integracyjnych -sukces ekonomiczny napędzał wolę dalszej pogłębionej integracji państw� Ten stan rzeczy pozwolił wyposażyć organizację w możliwość decydowania i wpływania na decydentów krajowych w kolejnych sferach dotąd wyłącznej aktywności państw� Niemniej na przestrzeni lat państwa unijne zazdrośnie i z wielką determinacją strzegły kompetencji dotyczących szeroko pojmowanego bezpieczeństwa, w tym nade wszystko obronno-ści� Kolejne próby przyspieszenia integracji w tej materii okazywały się nie na tyle skuteczne, by można było mówić o realnej wspólnej polityce obronnej� Jedna z ostatnich inicjatyw -PESCO -ma pomóc odmienić tę sytuację� Konieczne There were three factors that led to closer cooperation in the matters of EU security and defence: a) publication of the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016; b) Great Britain's decision to leave the EU; and c) antipathy of some of EU states to President Trump� Since 2016, studies on the common security and defence policy of the EU have been focusing primarily on two aspects: 1) analysing the EUGS (Barbé & Morillas, 2019;Tocci, 2016;Biscop, 2016, pp� 91-100) and 2) functioning of EU defence after Brexit (Duke, 2019;Svendsen, 2019;Deschaux-Dutard, 2019)� The EUGS implementation plan, adopted by the Council in November 2016, initiated the process of developing relevant military, civilian and industrial instruments as well as financial mechanisms; a crucial element of the military aspect is to be Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)� As noted by Sven Bishop, "[s]uccess is obviously not guaranteed, but seems more likely in this case than in the past" (Biscop, 2018, p� 161)� The success of PESCO will depend on many actors involved in shaping EU security and defence policy (Jopp & Schubert, 2019;Blockmans & Crosson, 2019), yet the most crucial components are the will, attitude and involvement of the participating states� This article aims to study the involvement of EU member states in the implementation of PESCO projects� The first part characterizes permanent structured cooperation, including its legal foundation and premises, commitments that must ...…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%