The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach

Kriegel, Uriah

doi:10.1023/b:phen.0000040833.23356.6a

Cited by 16 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…These cases cannot be explained without reference to inner awareness, which must therefore accompany perceptual awareness. Kriegel (2004b) too has argued for peripheral inner (self-) awareness based on functional considerations. The distinction between focal and peripheral awareness in the case of outer perceptual (visual) awareness with respect to its functional role is extended to peripheral inner (self-) awareness.…”

Section: Argument From the Functional Role Of Inner Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Inner Awareness Always Accompany Outer Awareness During Perception?

Chaturvedi

Sarma

2019

PRB

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In the present paper, we defend the thesis that outer-world-directed perceptual consciousness is always accompanied by an inner awareness (IAOA). This is contrary to the view that outer-world-directed conscious mental states are not accompanied by an inner awareness, which is held by Gennaro (2008) against Kriegel’s (2009a and 2009b) self-representationalism. We attempt to show why philosophers like Gennaro get it wrong when they deny the IAOA thesis by critically examining his arguments against it and by giving arguments in its favour.

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Section: Argument From the Functional Role Of Inner Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Inner Awareness Always Accompany Outer Awareness During Perception?

Chaturvedi

Sarma

2019

PRB

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“…The subjective character of an emotional experience is normally a matter of what I have called elsewhere peripheral self-awareness (Kriegel, 2004). It is a phenomenon of awareness, to be sure, since there is no sense in which a mental state could be for me if I am unaware of its occurrence.…”

Section: The Phenomenological Structure Of Conscious Emotional Experimentioning

confidence: 99%

The Reduction of Conscious Emotion

Kriegel¹

2008

THS

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The main purpose of this paper is to outline a possible reductive explanation of emotion in neurophysiological terms. But it will also be argued that such a reductive explanation is more difficult to achieve than is commonly thought, in that it has to address conscious emotional experience. It will be argued that when an emotion is conscious, what makes it the emotion it is, and an emotion at all, is its phenomenal character, and when an emotion is unconscious, what makes it the emotion it is, and an emotion at all, is the phenomenal character it would have if it were conscious. This has the consequence that the theory of emotion cannot be insulated from the theory of consciousness, and a reductive explanation of emotion must target the phenomenal character of conscious emotional experiences. A possible reductive explanation of this sort will be outlined.

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“…The Husserlian phenomenological differentiation of experience into intentional-act and intentional-object poles involves no commitment to this notion of bare awareness. 15 Kriegel (2004) interprets this implicit self-awareness as a form of marginal or peripheral awareness. This view can also be found in Gurwitsch (1964).…”

Section: Transparency and Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%