The Guns of November

Stoll, Richard J.

doi:10.1177/0022002784028002002

Cited by 89 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Much has been written of the effect that electoral considerations have upon presidential behavior. Stoll (1984) finds that there are fewer visible uses of force associated with presidential reelections in peacetime and a slight increase in uses during wartime. James and Oneal (1991) and Oneal and Lian (1992) also find evidence that during election periods presidents are more likely to use military force.…”

Section: American Military Involvement Abroadmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Judging by their ample references to the impact of domestic political conditions on presidents' decisions to use military force, many international relations scholars would appear to agree more with the latter group. Stoll (1984), Ostrom and Job (1986), and James and Oneal (1991) all indicate that some combination of electoral periods, the misery index, and presidential popularity exercise a significant effect on the political use of force. Interestingly, Russett (1990) finds evidence that the assumption that presidents stand to gain at home from their adventures abroad on which these scholars base their hypotheses may not hold true in reality.…”

Section: American Military Involvement Abroadmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the principal limitations of previous research concerning the decision to use force has been the lack of the concept of an opportunity to use force. Previous research generally either focused on presidential decisions that resulted in deployment of the military and ignored cases where presidents opted not to use force (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978;Zelikow, 1987;Brands, 1987), or predicted decisions to use force during quarterly or yearly time intervals Stoll, 1984). This conceptualization of the use of force almost entirely ignores the international events that lead presidents to make a decision about the need for military force.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force

Meernik

1994

International Studies Quarterly

113

133

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Section: American Military Involvement Abroadmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: American Military Involvement Abroadmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force

Meernik

1994

International Studies Quarterly

113

133

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“…As for the United States, Russett (1990a) and Wang (1996) report that military action is more likely shortly before an election; but several others (Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger 1992; Meernik 1994, 2004; Meernik and Waterman 1996; Gowa 1998; Fordham 1998a; cf. Stoll 1984) find no evidence that elections influence the use of force.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921?2001

Oneal¹,

Tir²

2006

Int Studies Q

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A democratic leader, anticipating a ''rally 'round the flag effect,'' may have an incentive to divert attention from domestic economic problems by becoming involved in military conflict abroad, undermining Immanuel Kant's prescription for ''perpetual peace.'' We assess the risk to the democratic peace by evaluating this diversionary incentive within a general dyadic model of interstate conflict, 1921-2001, using both directed and nondirected analyses. Our results indicate that economic conditions do affect the likelihood that a democracy, but not an autocracy, will initiate a fatal militarized dispute, even against another democracy. Economic growth rates sufficiently low to negate the democratic peace are, however, rare; and the behavior of five powerful democracies raises further doubts about the importance of diversions. We find no significant evidence that a bad economy makes a democratic state less likely to be targeted by others, nor does the timing of legislative elections influence the decision of democratic leaders to use force. Although economic conditions affect the likelihood of a fatal dispute for democracies, the influence is sufficiently small that Kant's hope for a more peaceful world does not seem misplaced.Scores of studies indicate that democracies are much less likely to become involved in military conflict with one another than are two autocracies or a mixed pair of states. This is good news because the number of democracies continues to grow. The long-term prospect, according to Immanuel Kant (1991Kant ( [1795) and other liberals, is a world of democratic states living together peacefully. There has been an important undercurrent of research, however, suggesting that democratic leaders sometimes have an incentive to use military force, not to make their countries more secure, but to improve their public approval ratings and their chance of remaining Authors' note: We are grateful for the helpful comments of

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“…However, the empirical findings on this matter are quite inconsistent. While many studies find evidence for the diversionary hypothesis (e.g., Ward and Widmaier 1982; Stoll 1984; Ostrom and Job 1986; Russett 1990; James and Oneal 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Hess and Orphanides 1995; Miller 1995; Gelpi 1997; Fordham 1998; Dassel and Reinhardt 1999; Miller 1999; Morgan and Anderson 1999; DeRouen 2000; Enterline and Gleditsch 2000; Fordham 2002), 1 many other studies find evidence against it (e.g., Meernik 1994; Meernik and Waterman 1996; Leeds and Davis 1997; Gowa 1998; Meernik 2000; Mitchell and Moore 2002; Chiozza and Goemans 2003).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War

Tarar

2006

Int Studies Q

140

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I use a game theoretic model of diversionary war incentives to help explain the lack of a consistent empirical relationship between domestic conditions and the use of force abroad. I argue that when diversionary behavior is about demonstrating competence rather than creating a short-term ''rally round the flag'' effect, a leader has incentives to use force against a challenging target, and this may dissuade many would-be diversionary uses of force. I then combine the diversionary model with the bargaining approach to war and show that when war is costly and bargaining is allowed, the diversionary leader can be peacefully appeased short of war as long as the benefit of holding office is not too large compared with the cost of war and other factors. However, when the office holding benefit is sufficiently large, the diversionary incentive emerges as a new domestic politics based ''rationalist explanation for war.''The well-known diversionary theory of war (Levy 1989) stipulates that domestic problems lead to incentives for a nation's leader to engage in aggressive foreign behavior, perhaps even war, to boost the nation's cohesiveness, to enhance the leader's popularity, and to thus increase her chances of remaining in power. There is now an immense empirical literature that attempts to ascertain whether or not leaders are more likely to be involved in foreign disputes when facing domestic problems. However, the empirical findings on this matter are quite inconsistent. While many studies find evidence for the diversionary hypothesis (e.g., Ward and

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The Guns of November

Cited by 89 publications

References 8 publications

Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force

Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force

Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921?2001

Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War

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