Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force

Abstract

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Climate Change: Potential Effects on Demands for US Military Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response

“…This trend (or lack thereof) suggests that disaster response is determined not necessarily by partisan politics, but perhaps by other political factors, such as foreign policy. This is consistent with theories that domestic politics play a small role in the decision to commit US military forces, with international considerations playing a more significant role [91].…”

Modeling the President's Security Agenda

“…When American interests are threatened, the president can be expected to respond on a tit-for-tat basis with little regard for the demands of domestic politics. Although this perspective is assailed on nearly all fronts, several studies tender evidence that when making foreign policy decisions, the situation abroad largely compels the president's actions (Blechman and Kaplan 1978, Lindsay et al 1992, Meernik 1994, Wang 1996. It is, however, not necessary to subscribe to the assumptions of realism to acknowledge international factors as important to explanations of presidential foreign policy behavior.…”

“…Some studies find support for diversionary theories that when events at home turn against the president or when elections approach, the president is more likely to pursue dramatic policies abroad (Stoll 1984, Ostrom and Job 1986, James and Oneal 1991, DeRouen 1995, Wang 1996. Other researchers suggest a downturn on the domestic front and rapidly approaching elections demand the president's time, energy and resources at home, reducing his inclination to act overseas (Lindsay et al 1992, Meernik 1994. Although the effects of these variables remain uncertain, their close link to the president's time, energies and power suggest they are likely to influence the president's inclination to attend to conflicts abroad.…”

Going the Distance: The Price of Projecting Power

“…States may obtain rents using coercion but this is not necessary for power projection to occur. States, such as the United States, project power for a variety of security related reasons such as the protection of sea lanes (Posen 2003), and the defense of allies (Blechman and Kaplan 1978;Meernik 1994;Meernik 2008). Such power projection behavior does not directly lead to the use of force or breakdowns in bargaining with other states.…”