The Hegemonic Politics of ‘Strategic Autonomy’ and ‘Resilience’: COVID‐19 and the Dislocation of EU Trade Policy

Abstract

The outbreak of COVID‐19 in March 2020 led to substantial upheaval in the EU's trade policy. Over the course of a year, EU Trade Policy as a field witnessed the launch of hitherto unthinkable ideas; the proliferation of a range of new buzzwords such as resilience, autonomy, and reshoring; and ultimately the arrival of a new consensus in the Trade Policy Review of February 2021. This article uses a discourse‐theoretical approach (PDT) to retrace the political process that unfolded throughout this year, from the start of the COVID‐19 crisis, to a fundamental dislocation of EU trade politics, and ultimately to the consolidation of a partial, temporary, and frail new hegemony within the policy field. Our goal is to explain the trajectory and the dynamics of this process by studying the discourses, the framings, and the political strategies that comprised the hegemonic struggle underlying it.

As Open as Possible, as Autonomous as Necessary: Understanding the Rise of Open Strategic Autonomy in EU Trade Policy

“…Globalization has not ‘proven immune to national interests (…) and free trade is no longer risk‐free’ (Interview 12). COVID‐19 has put an even ‘more crude light on the fragility of global supply chains’ (Interview 12), creating an additional ‘moment of dislocation’ (Jacobs et al ., 2022) for an already strained trade policy paradigm.…”

“…199–200), are just ‘a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the renewal of the European project’; they are merely a ‘trigger’ for the EU to rethink its role in the world and an opportunity for actors to challenge the status quo (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989, pp. 96–7; Jacobs et al ., 2022).…”

“…A changing and less stable global environment (Lavery and Schmid, 2021) – from the weaponization of interdependence to the COVID‐19 pandemic to the war in Ukraine – has not only been a ‘big wake‐up call for the EU’ (Interview 2), making it once again rethink its ‘roles and interests in the world’ (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989, p. 95). It has also provided an opening for neo‐mercantilist and socially oriented actors to challenge the dominant neoliberal logic of economic welfare maximization through internal and external liberalization (Jacobs et al ., 2022).…”

“…Theoretically, we combine various strands of European integration research in a novel theoretical framework that focuses on (i) how changes in the external environment (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; Lavery and Schmid, 2021; Schimmelfennig 2021) (ii) create an opening for actors to challenge a hegemonic compromise (van Apeldoorn, 2002; Bulmer and Joseph, 2016; Warlouzet, 2017) during which (iii) ambiguous ideas can be used as coalition magnets to forge a new compromise (Jabko, 2006; Béland and Cox, 2016). Empirically, we are among to first to shed light on the coalitional and ideational politics underlying the recent evolution of European trade policy under the banner of OSA (Eliasson and Garcia‐Duran, 2022; Gehrke, 2022; Helwig, 2022; Jacobs et al ., 2022).…”

“…The public and policy debates surrounding the rise of (open) strategic autonomy predate the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But these events have undoubtedly provided much additional urgency and momentum to these debates, not least by prompting the Commission to launch its trade policy review one year earlier (Jacobs et al ., 2022). More than ever then, understanding why Europe embraced (open) strategic autonomy and how it already affects its (trade) policy is essential for understanding Europe's role in an increasingly geopolitical world (Gehrke, 2022).…”