With the advent of the Eurozone crisis, Euroscepticism has become increasingly mainstreamed. This is discernible across Europe at the level of public opinion, among political parties and civil society groups, within the EU institutions themselves and in terms of changing and more challenging media discourses. Against the backdrop of the 2014 European elections and a potential referendum on UK membership of the EU, the purpose of this article is to introduce an evolving debate. It begins with discussion of the 'state of the art' with regard to the study of Euroscepticism, before focusing on the significance of the latest European elections themselves. It then provides an overview of the various articles in the collection, explaining their relevance in helping to unravel the complexity and diversity of opposition towards 'Europe' and the extent to which Euroscepticism has become part of the mainstream with regard to European political debate.

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Knowledge of what voters prefer is central to several theories of democratic representation and accountability. Despite this, we know little in a comparative sense of how well politicians know citizens' policy preferences. We present results from a study of 866 politicians in four countries. Politicians were asked to estimate the percentage of public support for various policy proposals. Comparing more than 10,000 estimations with actual levels of public support, we conclude that politicians are quite inaccurate estimators of people's preferences. They make large errors and even regularly misperceive what a majority of the voters wants. Politicians are hardly better at estimating public preferences than ordinary citizens. They not only misperceive the preferences of the general public but also the preferences of their own partisan electorate. Politicians are not the experts of public opinion we expect them to be.

The 2014 European elections demonstrated the scale and success of the EU's opponents. Radical and populist parties topped the polls in some countries while others gained parliamentary representation for the first time. At the same time, Euroscepticism has entered the mainstream, with an increase of anti-EU rhetoric among government parties and the European Conservative and Reformist group becoming the third largest party in the European Parliament. In this context, this article aims at analysing the strategies developed by Eurosceptics from the left, the right and the mainstream once elected to parliament but also at providing food for thought regarding the implications of an (increased) presence of Eurosceptic MEPs. It provides a typology of four roles played by Eurosceptics, showing the diversity of their strategies. It then argues that the presence of these dissenting voices might be an asset for the EU's legitimacy.