2015
DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2015.1042974
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The hidden side of the Ultimatum Game: The role of motivations and mind-reading in a two-level one-shot Ultimatum Game

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“…Knowledge of opponent structure has previously been discussed in the context of one-shot games, where it is assumed that the participant will only have to interact with any given opponent once. Of note are the predictions that arise from normative models of decision-making during one-shot games in which, logically, participants should always defect in the Prisoner's Dilemma (e.g., [35]), and, should always offer the smallest proportion of money available to the other player in the Ultimatum game (e.g., [36]). Despite this, there is a surprising amount of 'economically irrational' and cooperative behavior exhibited in one-shot games [33].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Knowledge of opponent structure has previously been discussed in the context of one-shot games, where it is assumed that the participant will only have to interact with any given opponent once. Of note are the predictions that arise from normative models of decision-making during one-shot games in which, logically, participants should always defect in the Prisoner's Dilemma (e.g., [35]), and, should always offer the smallest proportion of money available to the other player in the Ultimatum game (e.g., [36]). Despite this, there is a surprising amount of 'economically irrational' and cooperative behavior exhibited in one-shot games [33].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%