The ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ in self-referential awareness: a neurocognitive hypothesis

Abstract

The nature of the 'self' and self-referential awareness has been one of the most debated issues in philosophy, psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Understanding the neurocognitive bases of self-related representation and processing is also crucial to research on the neural correlates of consciousness. The distinction between an 'I', corresponding to a subjective sense of the self as a thinker and causal agent, and a 'Me', as the objective sense of the self with the unique and identifiable features constituting one's self-image or self-concept, suggested by William James, has been re-elaborated by authors from different theoretical perspectives. In this article, empirical studies and theories about the 'I' and the 'Me' in cognition and self-related awareness are reviewed, including the relationships between self and perception, self and memory, the development of the self, self-referential stimulus processing, as well as related neuroimaging studies. Subsequently, the relations between self and different aspects of consciousness are considered. On the basis of the reviewed literature and with reference to Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, a neurocognitive hypothesis is formulated about 'I'-related and 'Me'-related self-referential awareness. This hypothesis is extended to metacognitive awareness and a form of non-transitive consciousness, characteristic of meditation experiences and studies, with particular reference to the notion of mindfulness and other Buddhist constructs.

Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness

“…During TM, physiological changes have been shown to correspond with a least excited state of consciousness. This state can be experienced even by novice practitioners [1,65,66]. The TM technique is characterized by automatic self transcending and requires minimum cognitive control.…”

“…In philosophy and neuroscience alike, it is not understood how the brain functions to form the mind [1,2]. The brain is a physical organ that can be touched and tested, yet the mind is a substance that has no physical qualities that can be examined objectively.…”

“…First person perspective uses the 'I' pronoun, and is the source of thoughts, actions, and body ownership, while the third person perspective uses the 'Me' pronoun, linking together past, present, and future. If this narrative self is disrupted, amnesia occurs [1].…”

Experiential Self-Referential Processing & Autobiographical Memory Retrieval: A Preliminary Look

“…Two distinct modes of self-referential processing have been proposed, and subsequently supported by neuroimaging research (Farb et al, 2007;Gallagher, 2000;Tagini & Raffone, 2010). These dual modes include an "experiential mode" of selfreferential processing, characterized by momentary awareness of the psychological present, and a "narrative mode" of self-referential processing involving past experiences and future goals that constitute a key source of representations supporting our continuity of identity over time (Farb et al, 2007;Gallagher, 2000;Tagini & Raffone, 2010). Although the relationship between selfreference and memory has been explored, these studies utilize methods that may only engage a narrative form of self-reference (Macrae et al, 2004;Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977;Symons & Johnson, 1997), leaving the relationship between the experiential mode of self-reference and memory processes open for investigation.…”

“…Two distinct modes of self-referential processing have been proposed, and subsequently supported by neuroimaging research (Farb et al, 2007;Gallagher, 2000;Tagini & Raffone, 2010). These dual modes include an "experiential mode" of selfreferential processing, characterized by momentary awareness of the psychological present, and a "narrative mode" of self-referential processing involving past experiences and future goals that constitute a key source of representations supporting our continuity of identity over time (Farb et al, 2007;Gallagher, 2000;Tagini & Raffone, 2010).…”