The Force Publique’s campaigns in the Congo-Arab War, 1892-1894

Abstract

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The Force Publique and frontier warfare in the late 19th Century Congo Free State

“…Indigenous chiefs, keen to benefit from co-operation with the CFS (even if just temporarily) often provided thousands of men skilled in reconnaissance, pursuit, and local fighting methods. The Zappo-Zap and Ngongo Luteta's former 'Arab' Batetela are two good examples of such mutually-beneficial relations -that is until Ngongo's ill-advised summary execution for alleged atrocities in 1893 (Vincent, 2015;Draper, 2019). 5 These allies not only helped to redress the inevitable numerical shortfall of the Force Publique but offered greater tactical and operational flexibility that complemented the rigidity of their own Europeanised native forces.…”

“…During the Congo-Arab War of 1892-1894, Dhanis, Chaltin, and Michaux worked hard to coordinate efforts against multiple threats emanating from the various Arab chiefs situated throughout the Maniema region. Although forced to operate independently on occasion to secure the initiative through offensive action, the ultimate aim was to consolidate disparate Force Publique detachments for more decisive action (Draper, 2019). Internal disputes between the Arab chiefs often prevented them from concentrating their forces fully, offering an unparalleled opportunity for the Force Publique to defeat them in detail and bring the war to a successful conclusion within three years (Marechal, 1992).…”

War on the frontier

“…In his case, the answer was the razzia, which married local methods with the Marshal of France and Governor-General of Algeria Thomas Bugeaud's idea that, to be victorious in Algeria, his forces needed to become "even more Arab than the Arabs" (Porch, 2013, p. 20). Elsewhere, the employment of native auxiliaries to support the more regularised forces in terms of mobility and intelligence gathering, helped to fill the tactical and operational blind spots (Spiers, 1992;Draper 2019).…”