The<i>MIND</i>argument and libertarianism

Finch, Alicia; Warfield, Ted A.

doi:10.1093/mind/107.427.515

Cited by 129 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Once it was seen that (β) was invalid, though, the Mind argument lost most of its force. Libertarians could now happily reject (β) -and the Mind argument with it -while weilding a Consequence Argument patched up with (β2) (This is the main point of Finch and Warfield 1998).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 83%

The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism

Turner

2009

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 83%

The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism

Turner

2009

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…As a is unquestionably valid, conclude McKay and Johnson, b must be invalid. 7 3 Finch and Warfield's Improved Consequence Argument Finch and Warfield (1998) accept McKay and Johnson's argument. They go on, however, to offer an Improved Consequence Argument that relies neither on a nor on b, but on:…”

Section: A Counterexample To Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against the Mind Argument

Graham

2009

Philos Stud

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The Mind Argument is an argument for the incompatibility of indeterminism and anyone's having a choice about anything that happens. Peter van Inwagen rejects the Mind Argument not because he is able to point out the flaw in it, but because he accepts both that determinism is incompatible with anyone's having a choice about anything that happens and that it is possible for someone to have a choice about something that happens. In this paper I first diagnose and clear up a confusion in recent discussions of the Mind Argument and then go on to show why it is a bad argument.Keywords Free will Á The Mind Argument Á Consequence Argument Á Determinism Á Indeterminism Peter van Inwagen has offered an argument-the Consequence Argument-for the claim that if determinism is true, no one has, or ever had, a choice about anything that happens. He has also offered an argument-the Mind Argument-for the claim that if determinism is false, no one has, or ever had, a choice about anything that happens. As van Inwagen is someone who holds that there are some things that happen that people sometimes do have a choice about, he is in a bit of a pickle. Of his two arguments, he is more sure of the Consequence Argument and so he has unhappily concluded that, though he cannot discern the problem with it, the Mind Argument is unsound. In this paper, I will try to point out what, in particular, is wrong with the Mind Argument. First, I will present both the Consequence Argument and the Mind Argument, and describe the back and forth of a recent discussion of their interrelation. Then, I will show how this discussion has been

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“…This naturally might lead one to view the luck argument as a species of the Mind argument. I have, however, opted, as have others (Finch and Warfield 1998), to treat 'the Mind argument' as simply the third strand of the Mind argument (van Inwagen 1983, pp. 142-150), thus treating the luck and Mind arguments as distinct.…”

Section: The Luck (And Mind) Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Transfer-principles, like BETA, have played an important role not just in the Mind argument, but also in the consequence argument for incompatibilism about free will and determinism. Finch and Warfield (1998) offer a way to remedy BETA so that it can be employed in a sound argument for incompatibilism about free will and determinism but, interestingly, is useless for reformulating the Mind argument. See Nelkin (2001), however, for an argument that shows that even Finch and Warfield's revised transfer principle raises trouble for libertarians.…”

Section: The Mind Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument

Franklin

2010

Philos Stud

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In this paper I seek to defend libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility against two well-known arguments: the luck argument and the Mind argument. Both of these arguments purport to show that indeterminism is incompatible with the degree of control necessary for free will and moral responsibility. I begin the discussion by elaborating these arguments, clarifying important features of my preferred version of libertarianism-features that will be central to an adequate response to the arguments-and showing why a strategy of reconciliation (often referred to as ''deliberative libertarianism'') will not work. I then consider four formulations of the luck argument and find them all wanting. This discussion will place us in a favorable position to understand why the Mind argument also fails.

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TheMINDargument and libertarianism

Cited by 129 publications

References 12 publications

The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism

The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism

Against the Mind Argument

Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument

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