The illusion of discretion

Sylvan, Kurt

doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0796-z

Cited by 12 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 44 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In doxastic deliberation, can incompatible pragmatic and epistemic aims interact? As with PEC, this 13 For additional criticisms of McHugh's position, see Sullivan-Bissett (2017) and Sylvan (2016). structure involves pragmatic aims, but it does not, as we shall see, require us to accept pragmatism.…”

Section: Pei and Doxastic Deliberationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Weighing aims in doxastic deliberation

Atkinson¹

2019

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, I defend teleological theories of belief against the exclusivity objection. I argue that despite the exclusive influence of truth in doxastic deliberation, multiple epistemic aims interact when we consider what to believe. This is apparent when we focus on the processes involved in specific instances (or concrete cases) of doxastic deliberation, such that the propositions under consideration are specified. First, I out-line a general schema for weighing aims. Second, I discuss recent attempts to defend the teleological position in relation to this schema. And third, I develop and defend my proposal that multiple epistemic aims interact in doxastic deliberation-a possibility which, as of yet, has received no serious attention in the literature.

show abstract

Section: Pei and Doxastic Deliberationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 Appeals to the exclusivity thesis are apparent on both sides of the debate. For instance, see Archer (2015), Owens (2003), Shah (2003), Steglich-Petersen (2006, 2009), Sullivan-Bissett & Noordhof (2013, Sylvan (2016), andVelleman (2000). C. Doxastic deliberation is not an aim-motivated activity (the teleological thesis is false).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weighing aims in doxastic deliberation

Atkinson¹

2019

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Conceding this much, these voluntarists locate their arguments with respect to circumstances that allow discretion . As Kurt Sylvan puts the thought: ‘There are cases where it would be epistemically rational for a person either to believe p or to be agnostic on p given her total evidence E’ (, p. 1637). Notice, then, an analogy with the argument I offered for intending at will.…”

Section: Believing At Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intending, believing, and supposing at will

Shepherd

2018

Ratio

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Call this thesis about belief and action the ‘disanalogy thesis.’ As Kurt Sylvan notes (), Joseph Raz (), Carl Ginet (), Keith Frankish (), Philip Nickel (), and Conor McHugh (2013) all reject the disanalogy thesis, and they all reject it because they all think that, if a person finds herself in a situation where she's rationally permitted to believe some proposition and simultaneously rationally permitted to suspend judgment on that proposition, she can have direct control over whether she believes it without exhibiting any kind of cognitive defect. I think these authors are on to something.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control

Roeber

2019

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to what I will call 'the disanalogy thesis,' beliefs differ from actions in at least the following important way: while cognitively healthy people often exhibit direct control over their actions, there is no possible scenario where a cognitively healthy person exhibits direct control over her beliefs. Recent arguments against the disanalogy thesis maintain that, if you find yourself in what I will call a 'permissive situation' with respect to p, then you can have direct control over whether you believe p, and you can do so without manifesting any cognitive defect. These arguments focus primarily on the idea that we can have direct doxastic control in permissive situations, but they provide insufficient reason for thinking that permissive situations are actually possible, since they pay inadequate attention to the following worries: permissive situations seem inconsistent with the uniqueness thesis, permissive situations seem inconsistent with natural thoughts about epistemic akrasia, and vagueness threatens even if we push these worries aside. In this paper I argue that, on the understanding of permissive situations that is most useful for evaluating the disanalogy thesis, permissive situations clearly are possible. Epistemologists have grown increasingly interested in the question how epistemic rationality compares to practical rationality (Berker 2013, Cohen 2016, Rinard 2017, etc.), but epistemologists have been asking the more general question how belief relates to action for a very long time-for at least as long as they've wondered whether, and to what extent, we can control our beliefs. According to the currently dominant view, beliefs differ from actions in at least this way: while we often have direct control over our actions, we never have direct control over our beliefs. On this view, just as we might cause ourselves to blush by thinking about something embarrassing, we might cause ourselves to believe (e.g.) that the lights are on by looking at the lights and turning them on (Feldman 2001). But on this view, we can't form the belief that the lights are on, or any other belief, by simply deciding to form it, the way we can (for example) raise our arms by simply deciding to raise them. On this view, if direct control over our beliefs isn't fully conceptually impossible, it's at least impossible for cognitively healthy people like you and me. Perhaps Bennett's Credamites can do it (1990), but they aren't functioning properly, and we can't do it without getting ourselves into a defective cognitive state like theirs. Thus, while cognitively healthy people often exhibit direct control over their actions, there is no possible scenario where a cognitively healthy person exhibits direct control over her beliefs. Call this thesis about belief and action the 'disanalogy thesis.'

show abstract

The illusion of discretion

Cited by 12 publications

References 44 publications

Weighing aims in doxastic deliberation

Weighing aims in doxastic deliberation

Intending, believing, and supposing at will

Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About