The impact of carbon emissions tax on vertical centralized supply chain channel structure

Yu, Wei Ping; Shang, Hongyan; Han, Ruizhu

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2020.106303

Cited by 36 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 50 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Yu and Han (2017) investigated the impact of carbon emission taxation on the product pricing and carbon emission reduction under the centralized and decentralized circumstances. Similarly, Yu et al (2020) studied the impact of carbon emission tax on the choice of supply chain channel in the vertical supply chain. Benjaafar et al (2013) discussed the impact of four low-carbon policies on production and inventory decisions.…”

Section: Supply Chain Decisions Under Cap-and-trade Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Production and joint emission reduction decisions based on two-way cost-sharing contract under cap-and-trade regulation

Wang

Brownlee

2020

Computers & Industrial Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Supply Chain Decisions Under Cap-and-trade Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Production and joint emission reduction decisions based on two-way cost-sharing contract under cap-and-trade regulation

Wang

Brownlee

2020

Computers & Industrial Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…The results also showed that carbon taxes can effectively encourage manufacturers to invest in carbon reduction technologies or remanufacturing to reduce carbon emissions. Yu et al (2020) discussed the influence of carbon tax policy on single-and double-chain systems. They suggested that when the distribution of the power structure in the supply chain is feasible, the government should reduce the carbon tax to promote supply chain emission reductions.…”

Section: Carbon Emission Reductions Under Carbon Tax Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon emission reductions, pricing and social welfare of three-echelon supply chain considering consumer environmental awareness under carbon tax policy

Zhang

Qin²

2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With the rapid growth in carbon emissions from transport, reducing these emissions is becoming as important as reducing emissions from production. We took a transporter as a member of the supply chain system and constructed a three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer, transporter, and retailer. This study applies the Stackelberg game and Nash game to research the optimal carbon emission reductions, pricing, and social welfare when the government imposes a carbon tax on carbon emitters and consumers are environmentally conscious. The four scenarios were designed as follows: 1) non-cooperative decision-making (NN model), in which neither carbon emission reduction cooperation nor pricing cooperation takes place; 2) local-cooperative decision-making Ⅰ (CN model), in which only cooperation in the field of carbon emission reductions takes place; 3) local-cooperative decision-making Ⅱ (NC model), in which cooperation in the field of pricing without cooperation in the area of carbon emission reductions takes place; and 4) overall-cooperative decision-making (CC model), in which both cooperation in the field of carbon emission reductions and cooperation in the area of pricing take place. The results show that economic (as profit of the supply chain system), social (as pricing and social welfare), and environmental benefits (as the optimal carbon emission reductions) for the three-echelon supply chain will improve with the deepening of cooperation among the supply chain members. Carbon tax policies have different impacts on clean and polluting supply chains. High carbon tax can encourage clean supply chain to increase carbon emission reduction, but will lead to the reduction of carbon emission of polluting supply chain. A cross-shareholding contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal state of the overall cooperative decision. Finally, the paper provides suggestions on carbon emission reductions for enterprises and policymaking for the government.

show abstract

“…We define the dynamic demand forecast value of retailer E½ajf ¼ A: Assumption 5. According to Colonques and Jorge (2015), Yu et al (2020), the environmental improvement of green technology innovation can be expressed as follows:…”

Section: Information Sharing Of the Dynamic Demandmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to Colonques and Jorge (2015), Yu et al (2020), the environmental improvement of green technology innovation can be expressed as follows:where Ienv.N−D, Ienv.S−D and Ienv.S−C describe the environmental impact of manufacturers' green technology innovation in three models.…”

Section: Problem Statement Assumptions and Notationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A differential game analysis on green technology innovation in a supply chain with information sharing of dynamic demand

Junyi

Wang

2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

PurposeThe objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the information sharing of the dynamic demand on green technology innovation and profits in supply chain from a long-term perspective.Design/methodology/approachThe authors consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The retailer has access to the information of dynamic demand of the green product, whereas the manufacturer invests in green technology innovation. Differential game theory is adopted to establish three models under three different scenarios, namely (1) decentralized decision without information sharing of dynamic demand (Model N-D), (2) decentralized decision with information sharing of dynamic demand (Model S-D) and (3) centralized decision with information sharing of dynamic demand (Model S-C).FindingsThe optimal equilibrium results show that information sharing of dynamic demand can improve the green technology innovation level and increase the green technology stocks only in centralized supply chain. In the long term, the information sharing of dynamic demand can make the retailer more profitable. If the influence of green technology innovation on green technology stocks is great enough or the cost coefficient of green technology innovation is small enough, the manufacturer and decentralized supply chain can benefit from information sharing. In centralized supply chain, the value of demand information sharing is greater than that of decentralized supply chain.Originality/valueThe authors used game theory to investigate demand information sharing and the green technology innovation in a supply chain. Specially, the demand information is dynamic, which is a variable that changes over time. Moreover, our research is based on a long-term perspective. Thus, differential game is adopted in this paper.

show abstract

The impact of carbon emissions tax on vertical centralized supply chain channel structure

Cited by 36 publications

References 50 publications

Production and joint emission reduction decisions based on two-way cost-sharing contract under cap-and-trade regulation

Production and joint emission reduction decisions based on two-way cost-sharing contract under cap-and-trade regulation

Carbon emission reductions, pricing and social welfare of three-echelon supply chain considering consumer environmental awareness under carbon tax policy

A differential game analysis on green technology innovation in a supply chain with information sharing of dynamic demand

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About