The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies

Abstract

This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross-sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.

Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation

“…If a government intends to govern for the long-term (Jacobs, 2011), however, it makes sense to include all the relevant actors in a reform coalition, to build a consensus and generate trust that costs are shared equally by all actors, and to beware of aggressive cost-externalization. This makes it feasible to invest in the long-term, making compromises and sacrifices in order to facilitate a sound fiscal position and a sustainable welfare state in the future, and to steer clear of short-sighted populist initiatives for immediate but short-lived political gain (see also the argument about cooperative veto-points by Birchfeld & Crepaz, 1998;Crepaz, 1996;Crepaz, 1998). A major advantage of this approach is the reduction of the electoral costs of austerity and social security cutbacks.…”

Active or Passive? Reforming Employment Benefits in the OECD

“…4, No. 5; years, scholars have demonstrated powerful synergies between political institutions such as the electoral system and economic and social institutions such as the system of interest group representation (e.g., Birchfield & Crepaz, 1998;Crepaz & Moser, 2004;Iversen, 2005;Lijphart, 1999) (Note 14). If the economies of advanced industrialized democracies cluster in groups that are institutionally congruent (Hall & Soskice, 2001), then model covariates may explain dependent variables through more than one path.…”

“…As scholars have pointed out, both factors are inversely related to the capacity of a political system to implement new fiscal policies (Birchfield and Crepaz, 1998;Crepaz, 1998Crepaz, , 2002Crepaz and Moser, 2004). In the era of globalization, however, it is possible that dispersion of power through constitutional structures can work "in favour of more generous welfare states, by slowing down retrenchment" (Huber & Stephens, 2001, p. 32).…”

“…As a result, it adds to the number of veto players with the capacity to hinder policy change unless "the same party or coalition of parties controls all of the decision making organizations" (Ha, 2008, p. 793) (Note 21). Since the presidential or parliamentary character of the political system is included separately, our measure of cabinet composition helps to distinguish between countries where partisan veto players may be more numerous but also more cooperative (CMEs with minority coalition governments) and countries where veto players may be less numerous but more competitive (LMEs with single party governments) (Birchfield & Crepaz, 1998;Crepaz, 1998Crepaz, , 2002Crepaz & Moser, 2004 Table 1 presents three sets of results for the three employment benefit programs discussed above. For any given independent variable, direct effects are reported first, followed by indirect and total effects.…”

Sequenzorientierte Policy-Analyse. Warum die Rentenreform von Walter Riester nicht an Reformblockaden scheiterte

“…In the case of (one-party) minority governments, opposition parties are disregarded completely, based on the argument that in general they do not have effective veto power. Lijphart's approach (1999b) -linked to veto player theory by Birchfield and Crepaz (1998;see also Crepaz 2004) -is more ambiguous. In search for a theoretical rationale behind the two empirically identified dimensions of democracy, Lijphart draws on Goodin (1996) and argues that policymaking interactions along the executive-party dimension are characterized by "collective agency and shared responsibility", while those along the federal-unitary dimension are not.…”