This research Note has two complementary theoretical objectives. First, we shall attempt to place the form of interest representation and the involvement of interest groups in policy formation known as corporatism – or as democratic, societal, liberal or neo-corporatism – in a broader political context: is corporatism systematically linked with other democratic institutions and processes? Secondly, we shall try to fill a gap in the theory of consensus democracy. This theory holds that types of party, electoral, executive and legislative systems occur in distinct clusters, but it fails to link interest group systems to these clusters.

This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross-sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.

Abstract. Previous research on voter turnout has concluded that institutional factors such as compulsory voting, registration laws and the degree of disproportionality of the electoral system have a determining impact on the number of people who cast their ballots. This article goes beyond such an institutional explanation. It is hypothesized that a diverse political landscape which offers a great menu of political choices to electors is more likely to have a higher voter turnout than a political system in which the differences between the parties are small. The greater the range of political expression available the more people are stimulated to vote. This study found that countries with a high party polarization have significantly higher turnout rates than countries with a rather narrow political spectrum. In addition, countries in which a ‘postmaterialist party’is present in the national parliament also display significantly higher voter turnout rates than countries which lack such a party. In order to explain the determinants of voter turnout, not only institutional variables but also intrinsically political variables such as the number of parties, the type of parties and party polarization have to be introduced. To solve the puzzle of varying voter turnout rates, ‘politics’has to be brought back in.

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