The impact of financial sanctions on the Russian economy

Gurvich, E.; Prilepskiy, Ilya

doi:10.1016/j.ruje.2016.02.002

Cited by 92 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Russian economists (Shirov, Yantovskii, and Potapenko 2015) also estimate that overall losses to the Russian economy due to sanctions will amount to 8% of GDP. as far as short-term losses are concerned, the IMF expects them to equal 1.5% of GDP (IMF 2015, 7), whereas Gurvich and Prilepskiy (2015) estimate the losses due to sanctions by 2017 at 2.4% of GDP, while noting that this figure is only one-third the losses caused by the drop in oil prices.…”

Section: General Background Of Sanctions Against Russia and Its Impacmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In other words, the perception of risks, either based on actual assessments or simply on "business intuition, " is a major factor in firms' decision-making. The opinion that the long-term consequences of economic sanctions could de-motivate investment and slow modernization is more or less shared by Russian macroeconomists (Gurvich and Prilepskiy 2015;Shirov, Yantovskii, and Potapenko 2015).…”

Section: General Background Of Sanctions Against Russia and Its Impacmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Perception of risks associated with economic sanctions: the case of Russian manufacturing

Golikova

Kuznetsov

2016

Post-Soviet Affairs

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This paper is focused on assessing the risk factors for Russian manufacturing firms posed by sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU, US, and other countries in 2014. While there is an extensive literature assessing the successes and failures of international sanctions on the economies of both those imposing and targeted by sanctions on a macroeconomic level, we are more interested in trying to understand the corporate response -i.e. which firms evaluate the introduction and increasing scale of economic sanctions as a threat to their corporate strategy, and their possible reactions aimed at adjusting to a changing environment due to the geopolitical shock. Our research, based on a recent survey of manufacturing companies, provides evidence that over the last decade Russian manufacturing firms have become much more integrated into the global economy than is commonly assumed, through foreign direct investment, foreign trade (including imports of both technological equipment and raw materials and components), international partnerships, and by extensively supplying foreign companies that operate in Russia. Considering the self-selection effect of the top-performing firms in terms of foreign trade, we can state that sanctions could prove most harmful not only for the targeted firms, but for the entire population of betterperforming and globalized firms involved in foreign trade with the EU and Ukraine. Thus, the impact of the sanctions on the prospects of the Russian manufacturing sector may be very strong over the medium-to-long term.

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Section: General Background Of Sanctions Against Russia and Its Impacmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: General Background Of Sanctions Against Russia and Its Impacmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perception of risks associated with economic sanctions: the case of Russian manufacturing

Golikova

Kuznetsov

2016

Post-Soviet Affairs

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“…The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2015), Gurvich and Prilepskiy (2015), Mau and Ulyukaev (2015), and Mau (2017) examined how these various crisis-related events have affected Russia's overall economy, while Golikova and Kuznetsov (2017) investigated the impact specifically on manufacturing. Wegren, Nilssen, and Elvestad (2016) examined how Russian food security policy, which focuses on agricultural import substitution and self-sufficiency, has impacted the agricultural and food sector since Russia created its Doctrine on Food Security in 2010.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of Russia’s economic crisis and import ban on its agricultural and food sector

Liefert

Seeley

et al. 2019

Journal of Eurasian Studies

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This article examines how Russia’s economic crisis and ban on agricultural imports from the United States and other Western countries that began in 2014 have impacted its agricultural and food sector. The import ban was a Russian response to geopolitical tension with the West stemming from the country’s conflict with Ukraine, while the main cause of the economic crisis was a plunge in world oil prices. Given that the bulk of Russia’s export earnings come from oil and other energy products, the oil price decline triggered a major depreciation of the ruble against the US dollar and other major currencies. Ruble depreciation and the import ban have affected Russian consumers by reducing Russia’s imports of agricultural and food products, substantially raising food prices, and lowering consumption. However, the country’s basic food availability has not been threatened. By increasing domestic prices, the depreciation and import ban have stimulated agricultural production. The added output has reduced meat imports and raised grain exports. Russian meat imports in 2014–2016 (average annual) were about 40% lower compared to 2011–2013, while grain exports in 2014–2016 were 50% higher than in 2011–2013 (though production-enhancing favorable weather was also a cause).

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“…Assessing the external factors of recession of the Russian economy, Yevsey Gurvich and Ilya Prilepskiy come to the conclusion that Western sanctions have indeed had a negative impact on the Russian economy, leading to a loss of 2.4% of GDP on the horizon of 2017, but the fall in world oil prices has had greater importance and has led to the loss of 8.5% of GDP: "The difference in the impact of two compared shocks in budget revenues is especially great. If the fall in oil prices reduces their real value by 19-20% by 2016-2017, then the sanctions reduce them insignificantly (by 1-2%)" (Gurvich & Prilepsky, 2016).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional Policy of Russia in the Far East: Why Does It Go Wrong and What Is Apparently Seceded

Volynchuk¹,

Песцов²,

Kozlov³

et al. 2018

JPL

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The main subject matter in this article is the development policy of the Russian Far East as one of the aspects (constituent elements) of the regional development of the Russian Federation declared and implemented by the country's leadership since the mid-1990s. The Russian experience of regional policy related to the development of the Far East is of scientific and practical interest. The analysis of modern regional policy allows us talking about a new content interpretation, formation of basic approaches, principles in the development of the Russian Far East. The main features and peculiarities of this policy are considered by the authors in the context of a discussion about the so-called new paradigm of regional policy that is unfolding in recent years. The article analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the new regional policy based on the provision of tax and other benefits to business entities, and evaluates its effectiveness.

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The impact of financial sanctions on the Russian economy

Abstract: This article represents an extended version of the report "Scenarios of development for the Russian economy in the conditions of sanctions and falling oil prices" produced for the Civil Initiatives Committee in December 2014.

Cited by 92 publications

References 5 publications

Perception of risks associated with economic sanctions: the case of Russian manufacturing

Perception of risks associated with economic sanctions: the case of Russian manufacturing

The effect of Russia’s economic crisis and import ban on its agricultural and food sector

Regional Policy of Russia in the Far East: Why Does It Go Wrong and What Is Apparently Seceded

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