The impact of fiscal and political decentralization on local public investment in Indonesia

Kis‐Katos, Krisztina; Sjahrir, Bambang Suharnoko

doi:10.1016/j.jce.2017.03.003

Cited by 88 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…It was democratized only in 1998 after the demission of the long-time dictator Suharto and was strongly decentralized as recent as 2001. Moreover, it is a large country strongly divergent in geography and economic prosperity (Kis-Katos and Sjahrir 2017). Yet, the particular features of its political system make the analysis of Indonesia interesting beyond the country as such and sets it apart from the cases analyzed so far.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia

Gonschorek

Schulze

Sjahrir

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

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We analyze the allocation of discretionary grants from the central government to local governments in Indonesia. Using OLS and Fixed Effects models on an unbalanced panel data set for more than 400 Indonesian districts covering the period 2005-2013, we investigate whether the allocation of the grants is determined by the need of a district, by political alignment of the central government with the local district heads, or by reelection motives of the incumbent president. We find that grant allocations are not determined by need characteristics and that political considerations matter significantly. Districts with low support for the president received significantly more than the core supporting districts, especially in the year of national elections. This effect is limited to the first term of the president. In the second term, after which reelection is impossible, political considerations were largely absent. This pattern is consistent with the view that the incumbent president considers discretionary grants as an instrument to increase reelection probabilities. Unlike the evidence for most countries, we find no effect for political party alignment with local district heads. Our results are robust to the inclusion of a number of other variables capturing competing motives.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia

Gonschorek

Schulze

Sjahrir

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…A large share of public services was shifted from the national to the district level, 1 and within two years the share of public sector employees responding to regional governments increased from 12% to 67% (World Bank, 2003). The new intergovernmental fiscal relations also redefined three quarters of government transfers as non-earmarked, which resulted in increased fiscal spending (Kis-Katos and Sjahrir, 2017). However, the bulk of revenue generating powers remained centralized, resulting in large intergovernmental fiscal transfers to the regions (Gonschorek et al, 2018).…”

Section: Decentralizing Environmental Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Palm Oil and the Politics of Deforestation in Indonesia

2020

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. AbstractThis paper studies the interactions between political and economic incentives to foster forest conversion in Indonesian districts. Using a district-level panel data set from 2001 to 2016, we analyze variation in remotely sensed forest loss and forest fires as well as measures of land use licensing. We link these outcomes to economic incentives to expand oil palm cultivation areas as well as political incentives arising before idiosyncratically-timed local mayoral elections. Empirical results document substantial increases in deforestation and forest fires in the year prior to local elections. Additionally, oil palm plays a crucial role in driving deforestation dynamics. Variations in global market prices of palm oil are closely linked to deforestation in areas which are geo-climatically best suited for growing oil palm and they amplify the importance of the political cycle. We thus find clear evidence for economic and political incentives reinforcing each other as drivers of forest loss and land conversion for oil palm cultivation. JEL-Code: O13, Q15, Q56, P16

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“…Program pengampunan pajak di Indonesia diakui sebagai tax amnesty yang paling berhasil di dunia selama dekade terakhir. Bahkan, salah seorang pembicara dari Singapura menyatakan bahwa amnesti pajak sebagai the second best policy dan program tax amnesty di Indonesia dapat dijadikan model dunia di dalam konferensi tentang International Wealth Transfer di London pada bulan Maret 2017 (Kis-Katos & Sjahrir, 2017). Keberhasilan tax amnesty di Indonesia menurut Amir, Asafu-Adjaye, & Ducpham (2013) dipengaruhi oleh fitur program yang menarik, kerja keras dari peme rintah, dukungan politik, dan kerja sama dengan pihak lain.…”

Section: Hasil Dan Pembahasanunclassified

Ada Apa Setelah Tax Amnesty?

Okfitasari¹,

Meikhati²,

Setyaningsih

2017

jamal

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Çaşkurlu, 2011) dan pertumbuhan ekonomi negara (Huda & Hernoko, 2017). Pelaksanaan tax amnesty juga diharapkan menjadi momentum awal adanya perubahan perilaku kepatuhan sukarela yang lebih baik dari wajib pajak (Agbonika, 2015; Gupta & Lynch, 2016). Diharapkan dengan adanya tax amnesty, sumber dana wajib pajak yang ada di luar negeri dapat kembali masuk ke dalam negeri dan dalam jangka panjang dapat digunakan sebagai tambahan investasi dalam negeri untuk mendukung perekonomian nasional (Hamilton-Hart & Schulze, 2016). Dari sudut pandang fiskus, tax amnesty dilaksanakan untuk memperluas basis data perpajakan dan reformasi sistem (Bimon

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The impact of fiscal and political decentralization on local public investment in Indonesia

Cited by 88 publications

References 36 publications

To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia

To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia

Palm Oil and the Politics of Deforestation in Indonesia

Ada Apa Setelah Tax Amnesty?

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