2001
DOI: 10.1080/01402390108437820
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The impact of internal politics on Israel's reprisal policy during the 1950s

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Cited by 9 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Each of the rival's hostility measures is significant at the .001 level. Sprecher and DeRouen (2002; see also Wilkenfeld et al, 1972; Kuperman, 2001b) have also observed this type of pattern. This is also consistent with Blechman's (1972) event data analysis covering the years 1949–1969 that demonstrated that Israeli reprisals against its Arab neighbors were met with further hostility.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 58%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Each of the rival's hostility measures is significant at the .001 level. Sprecher and DeRouen (2002; see also Wilkenfeld et al, 1972; Kuperman, 2001b) have also observed this type of pattern. This is also consistent with Blechman's (1972) event data analysis covering the years 1949–1969 that demonstrated that Israeli reprisals against its Arab neighbors were met with further hostility.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 58%
“…States in an enduring rivalry care about the actions of each other, and are notably different from random pairs of states by their continued intensity and bellicosity (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). This adequately characterizes the situation in the Middle East, where the Arab–Israeli conflict can be observed on a daily basis (see Kuperman, 2001b). In addition to more traditional reciprocal relationships between rivals, the Middle East rivalries are intertwined as well.…”
Section: Enduring Rivalries and Hostilitiesmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…In the case of Strategy III (Tit‐for‐Tat), the risk of inducing escalation rather than deescalation is well known (Osgood 1962; Jervis, 1976:69, 100). Because of this, Israel's Foreign Minister and Prime Minister during the 1950s Moshe Sharett was strongly opposed to Israeli reprisals, fearing that rather than deterring the Arabs such actions intensified the conflict (Kuperman 2001a). Yet, also Strategies I and II are problematic.…”
Section: Three Hypothetical Strategies Of Asymmetric Warfarementioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, this policy has attracted considerable international criticism. In many instances when Arab civilians are killed, even Israelis have been critical (Kuperman, 2001b). But a large portion of the Israeli public view violent retaliations quite favorably.…”
Section: International and Domestic Constraints Influencing Israeli Military Retaliationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…During this period, the British threatened at least once to bomb with its air force (stationed in Jordan and Cyprus) if Israel did not stop retaliating against Jordan. Prime Minister Ben Gurion treated such threats very seriously(Kuperman, 2001b).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%