The Impact of Macro-Economic Shock on Russians

Abstract

In less than two decades, Russians have come to support their regime, but the 2008 world economic crisis questions whether this support can continue. Drawing on a June 2009 New Russia Barometer survey, the article asks how much difference the economic crisis has made for political support. A model with hypotheses about the potential influence on political attitudes of socialization and political performance as well as economic conditions is set out. Statistical analysis is used to compare the importance of macro-economic evaluations of the national economy with microeconomic household conditions. Determinants of regime support in 2009 are compared with pre-crisis NRB surveys.C reating support for a new regime takes time before its political and economic performance becomes evident, and a new regime is especially vulnerable to loss of support or repudiation. If a new regime survives for a decade or more, it can build up a stable base of support, reducing its vulnerability to internal challenges (Easton, 1965;Rustow, 1970). However, a regime that is characterized as stable is not static; it is in an equilibrium produced by a balance of political and economic influences that are subject to fluctuation in the short term around a central tendency (Young, 1998). In the political business cycle model, marginal adjustments in the choices that electors make produce a swing of the electoral pendulum.

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“…Сколь-нибудь значимого роста дестабилизации по таким показателям, как политические убийства, перевороты и попытки переворотов, репрессии и политические забастовки, в данном регионе не обнаружено, хотя заметен существен-ный рост интенсивности политических забастовок после 2010 года в Западной Европе (Коротаев, Мещерина и др., 2016). (Rose, Mishler, 2010).…”

The Putin Factor: Personalism, Protest, and Regime Stability in Russia

“…Until this point, Mr. Putin enjoyed the benefits of personalist appeal that won him high approval ratings and incredible vote totals in two rounds of Presidential voting (Colton ; Colton and Hale , ; Rose and Mishler ). He had borrowed against his own vote support to build the sprawling national organization that emerged as UR—a state‐led political party that came to back an amorphous political program called “Putin's Plan.” In short, he was the sole politician in Russia who could guarantee an election victory, either for himself or by lending his name to a candidate.…”