The impact of monitoring and sanctioning on unemployment exit and job-finding rates

McVicar, Duncan

doi:10.15185/izawol.49

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Optimal job search models predict that, ceteris paribus, fully-informed rational jobseekers should be persuaded to change their behaviour before sanction application (Abbring et al, 2005). This effect is referred to as the ex-ante or threat effect of a sanction (see, for example, Arni et al, 2013;Griggs and Evans, 2010;McVicar, 2014). There is limited existing empirical research on the ex-ante effect of sanctions before they are applied.…”

Section: Pre-sanction Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Varying Sanction Values on Future Compliance with Unemployment Benefit Requirements: An Empirical Analysis Using Australian Administrative Data

Wright¹,

Dollery²,

Kortt³

et al. 2022

Public Administration Quarterly

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Few studies have examined the effect of varying unemployment benefit sanctions before application on jobseekers’ behaviour. However, theory suggests this is the primary way sanctions operate. We examine the effect of increasing sanction values on future non-compliance using administrative data from the introduction of an Australian scheme with increasing sanctions for repeated non-compliance. Jobseekers with equivalent non-compliance histories have decreased hazards of non-compliance when the consequences are higher, even with small variation in sanction values. This suggests policies altering sanction values can effectively encourage compliance with benefit requirements, at least at the level imposed in Australia (low by international standards).

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Section: Pre-sanction Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Varying Sanction Values on Future Compliance with Unemployment Benefit Requirements: An Empirical Analysis Using Australian Administrative Data

Wright¹,

Dollery²,

Kortt³

et al. 2022

Public Administration Quarterly

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“…(Because of this advantage bivariate duration modelling has become an increasingly common approach in parts of the social policy literature, e.g. on the effect of benefit sanctions on welfare exit and job entry (see McVicar (2014) for a review). The bivariate duration approach has also been used in several studies of drug use effects, most commonly to investigate various effects of cannabis use (see Van Ours and Williams (2015) for a review).…”

Section: Approach To Estimation: a Bivariate Simultaneous Durations Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

Early Illicit Drug Use and The Age of Onset of Homelessness

McVicar

Moschion

Ours

2018

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A: Statistics in Society

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Summary We investigate the effect of taking up daily use of cannabis on the onset of homelessness by using Australian data. We use a bivariate simultaneous mixed proportional hazard model to address potential biases due to common unobservable factors and reverse causality. We find that taking up daily use of cannabis substantially increases the probability of transitioning into homelessness for young men but not young women. In contrast, the onset of homelessness increases the probability of taking up daily use of cannabis for young women but not for young men. In a trivariate extension we find that the use of other illicit drugs at least weekly has no additional effect on transitions into homelessness for either gender but there is a large if imprecisely estimated effect of onset of homelessness on taking up weekly use of such drugs for young women.

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“…Rules for stepwise sanctions up to a complete benefit withdrawal were implemented to minimize regional variation and to maximize consistency (see Dietz et al 2013). Numerous empirical studies show that monitoring the job search in combination with sanctions drastically reduces the duration of unemployment and increases the prospects of reemployment for the unemployed (see McVicar 2014). Therefore, sanctions are a useful complement to active labour market policy instruments.…”

Section: "Stick" Policy In Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

How to fight long-term unemployment: lessons from Germany

Spermann

2015

IZA J Labor Policy

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The number of long-term unemployed in Germany has stagnated at around one million for several years. Despite excellent labour market conditions, the long-term unemployment rate is well above the OECD average. Therefore, the "carrot and stick" principle of Hartz reforms is in clear need of further development. The author proposes an overall concept for preventing and reducing long-term unemployment and longterm basic income receipt. An important element is an activation strategy for the longterm unemployed and long-term basic income recipients that implies interim target setting and requires more and better trained case managers in the job centres. Jel codes: J31; J38

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The impact of monitoring and sanctioning on unemployment exit and job-finding rates

Cited by 7 publications

References 17 publications

The Effect of Varying Sanction Values on Future Compliance with Unemployment Benefit Requirements: An Empirical Analysis Using Australian Administrative Data

The Effect of Varying Sanction Values on Future Compliance with Unemployment Benefit Requirements: An Empirical Analysis Using Australian Administrative Data

Early Illicit Drug Use and The Age of Onset of Homelessness

How to fight long-term unemployment: lessons from Germany

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