2011
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1338282
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The Impact of Private Equity Ownership on Portfolio Firms' Corporate Tax Avoidance

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Cited by 68 publications
(44 citation statements)
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“…As the result, this study is still unable to confirm the research findings from the study of McGuire, Wang, and Wilson (2011) where firms with dual class stock ownership engage in lesser tax avoidance practices than other firms; and also from Badertscher, Katz and Rego (2011) who posited that private equity firms significantly increase the effectiveness of tax planning of firms they invest.…”
Section: Identifying Cta Related Factors Based On the Fraud Trianglecontrasting
confidence: 64%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…As the result, this study is still unable to confirm the research findings from the study of McGuire, Wang, and Wilson (2011) where firms with dual class stock ownership engage in lesser tax avoidance practices than other firms; and also from Badertscher, Katz and Rego (2011) who posited that private equity firms significantly increase the effectiveness of tax planning of firms they invest.…”
Section: Identifying Cta Related Factors Based On the Fraud Trianglecontrasting
confidence: 64%
“…McGuire, Wang, and Wilson (2011) found that firms with dual class stock ownership engage in less tax avoidance practices than other firms, consistent with managers who are insulated from takeovers avoid the costly effort associated with increased tax avoidance. Lastly, Badertscher, Katz and Rego (2011) provided the evidence that private equity firms significantly increase tax planning effectiveness of the firms in which they invest. This tax planning expertise persists even after private equity firm ownership is substantially reduced or terminated.…”
Section: Identifying Corporate Tax Avoidancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, empirical measures of tax avoidance that rely on financial statements have known limitations in part because they capture variation in tax avoidance as well as the choice between conforming and nonconforming tax avoidance. 64 In addition, reliable empirical measures of some of the interesting cross-sectional determinants, such as governance, are difficult to obtain because corporate governance is 62 Badertscher et al (2010) encounter similar issues in their comparison of private equity backed firms and public firms. 63 Gupta and Newberry (1997) explain 38 to 48 percent of GAAP ETR based on basic economic characteristics of the firm.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Badertscher et al (2009) empirically document that majority owned private equity backed firms face substantially lower marginal tax rates as a result of the tax shield of debt. Kaplan (1989b) has also shown empirically that interest deductibility benefits equal 21% of the premium paid in buyout transactions, whereas incremental depreciation tax benefits from marking up assets to market value equals 28% of the premium paid.…”
Section: Exogenous Cost Advantagesmentioning
confidence: 96%