“…Reasons for analysts' optimism in the pre-Regulation Fair Disclosure period have been tied to strategic reporting on the part of analysts to promote revenue-generating businesses for their brokerage firms and to cultivate information access with the management of firms they follow (e.g., Dugar and Nathan 1995;Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan 1998;Lim 2001); to the brokerage commission structure faced by analysts (e.g., Espahbodi, Dugar, and Tehranian 2001); to selective reporting on the part of analysts who report their beliefs only when they hold favorable views of the firm (McNichols and O'Brien 1997); and to information-processing biases (e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard 1992;Elgers and Lo 1994;Elliott, Philbrick, and Wiedman 1995). Kwag and Small (2007) provide evidence that analysts' optimistic bias continues in the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure period. 4.…”