The Impact of Technological Change on Market Power and Market Failure in Telecommunications

Miller, Edythe S.

doi:10.1080/00213624.2001.11506372

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…The introduction of color television, video-systems, high-definition TV and computer operating systems are instances of the recent industrial history that demonstrate the ubiquity of latent collective blockages and, thus, impeded the dissemination of new technologies. Thus, there are pervasive tendencies in the "markets" to generate innovation at "sub-optimal" levels (see, for example, Miller, 2001).…”

Section: Fragmentation Of the Value-added Chains And Technological Comentioning

confidence: 99%

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The “new” economy: complexity, coordination and a hybrid governance approach

Elsner

2004

International Journal of Social Economics

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The paper starts from the increasing spatial and functional fragmentation of value-added chains, global deregulation and dis-embedding of "markets", and interdependencies among the Net-based digital technologies. It develops a socioeconomic setting with ubiquitous direct interdependencies and interactions, Net-externalities, "strategic" strong uncertainty, and omnipresent collective-good and social-dilemma problems. These entail coordination failures, either in the form of conventional market failure (i.e. collective blockages of action) or of "wrong" or outmoded institutional coordination and, thus, widespread technological "lock-ins" that are indicative of insufficient ability of collective action. This is particularly true for de-regulated, individualistic cultures. In contrast, sustainable innovation, used in a broad, i.e. technological and institutional, sense, requires an effective collective action competence. This, in turn, requires a new and increased coordination. Against this background, the global corporate economy has spontaneously developed private individualist substitute arrangements to cope with the new complexity, such as local clusters and hub-and-spoke networks, which all have severe shortcomings. With reference to what we call the "Linux" paradigm, the paper discusses the possibility of a spontaneous evolutionary, i.e. collectively learned, institutional coordination through emergent collective action and networks with "good" governance. The paper argues that only a hybrid system that consists of "well-governed" networks and a new approach towards more comprehensive and deliberate "interactive" and "institutional" public policy, supporting collective learning and emergent institutional coordination , is capable of solving the complexity and coordination problems of the "new" economy by increasing certainty, stability and more continuous and comprehensive innovation. This new policy approach is outlined at the end.

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Section: Fragmentation Of the Value-added Chains And Technological Comentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As has been widely analyzed, the new digital and net technologies have pushed "power-ization" and centralization throughout the "new markets" (for telecommunication see, for example , Miller, 2001; for the mass media industries see, for example, Champlin and Knoedler, 2002).…”

Section: Technological Lock-ins Collective Goods and Social Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

The “new” economy: complexity, coordination and a hybrid governance approach

Elsner

2004

International Journal of Social Economics

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“…The various forms of market failure in media and communications have been subject to exhaustive analysis (see for example Ofcom (2008a). See also: Davies, 2005; Miller, 2001), but one neglected and ill understood form of market failure relates to the behavioural biases that undermine the ability of consumers to act in their own best interests. Regulatory attention of late has focused on how such biases should be incorporated in regulatory decision‐making[2].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consumer representation in UK communications policy and regulation

Tambini

2012

Info

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PurposeThe paper seeks to examine the role of consumer representation in communications policymaking with a focus on the UK. It aims to review the role of the Communications Consumer Panel and to argue that there is an important role to play for a consumer advocate due to behavioural biases, information overload, and market failure.Design/methodology/approachThe paper is based on analysis of all relevant reports and documentation published by the Ofcom Consumer Panel, as well as participant observation carried out by the author as a member of the panel. It also analyses switching data to make the case that the communications sector may be unique in terms of the low levels of switching between suppliers.FindingsThe paper finds that there is an ongoing role for a consumer advocate in media and communications and that this body should be independent of government and the regulatory agency.Research limitations/implicationsThe limitation of this research is that it focuses principally on only one sector, though it does reference a literature that covers other sectors, and in a paper of this length full comparison of other sectors would be impossible.Practical implicationsThe paper suggests that the communications sector would be well served by its own separate consumer representation body and that this should have close links to, but be independent of, Ofcom.Social implicationsThis paper has relevance to consumer representation in communications regulation and policy in countries beyond the UK. It examines the peculiarity of the communications market and the particular difficulties consumers face in fast moving technically challenging markets.Originality/valueThe paper examines a particularly important sector of consumer representation at a time when policy on a new regulatory structure is being set. It offers the perspective of a researcher who has also been a member of the Consumer panel, and, as such, it provides valuable insight at a crucial time.

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“…Bien que la généralisation ne soit pas du tout triviale, ces recherches ont tout de même permis d'identifier certains caractères spécifiques à l'entreprise réseau qui la distinguent de l'entreprise dite classique ou traditionnelle. Ces recherches ont également motivé plusieurs (Addleson, 2001;Beimans, 1996;Elfring et De Man, 1998;Emshoff, 1993;Furubotn, 2001;Miller, 2001;O'Farrel et Wood, 1999;Piercy et Cravens, 1995;Salancik, 1995;Scheffran, 1993;Walker, 1997) à se poser des questions sur la validité, pour l'entreprise réseau, du cadre théorique de l'entreprise basée essentiellement sur la théorie économique néoclassique, appelée aussi théorie de l'équilibre concurrentiel (Tirole, 1993;Guerrien, 1989;Stigler, 1968). Notons que cette dernière a été à la base du développement de théories telles la théorie des coûts de transaction (Williamson, 1975(Williamson, , 1996, la théorie de l'avantage concurrentiel basé sur les activités (Porter, 1985(Porter, , 1991 et la théorie de l'organisation industrielle (Tirole, 1993;Stigler, 1968).…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Vers un cadre théorique de l’entreprise réseau

H'Mida

Lakhal

2004

rum

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Résumé Nous proposons dans ce document un ensemble d’hypothèses sur lesquelles un cadre théorique pour l’entreprise réseau pourrait s’appuyer. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous analysons, d’une part, le cadre théorique de l’entreprise traditionnelle basé essentiellement sur la théorie économique néoclassique, la théorie des coûts de transaction, la théorie de l’avantage concurrentiel basé sur les ressources, la théorie de l’avantage concurrentiel basé sur les activités et la théorie de l’organisation industrielle. D’autre part, nous définissons l’entreprise réseau et présentons ses principales caractéristiques. En confrontant les hypothèses de base de ce cadre traditionnel aux caractéristiques de l’entreprise réseau, nous montrons qu’elles ne constituent pas une base adéquate pour modéliser cette dernière. D’où la pertinence de l’ensemble des hypothèses proposées.

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The Impact of Technological Change on Market Power and Market Failure in Telecommunications

Cited by 11 publications

References 5 publications

The “new” economy: complexity, coordination and a hybrid governance approach

The “new” economy: complexity, coordination and a hybrid governance approach

Consumer representation in UK communications policy and regulation

Vers un cadre théorique de l’entreprise réseau

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