The impacts of sales efforts and mode of payment on the competition between agent and retailer

Duan, Housheng; Deng, Sijing; Song, Haiqing; Xu, Jiayan

doi:10.1016/j.omega.2021.102416

Cited by 22 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…In practice, some manufacturers hire sales managers to enhance their sales force at the terminal. Duan et al [39] conducted detailed analysis of this matter and found that sales volume is not always negatively correlated with the cost of sales. Decision-makers may be risk averse, so Li et al [40] focused on what risk factors should be considered in supply chain pricing and marketing effort decisions.…”

Section: Marketingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a two-tier decentralized decision-making supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (he) and a retailer (she), the manufacturer is responsible for producing the products and selling them wholesale to the retailer, and the retailer sells the products to consumers in the market. Furthermore, we assume that both the manufacturer and the retailer are rational and seek to maximize their own interests [4,5,39]. Previous research has demonstrated that market demand is significantly influenced by both the price of the product and the marketing efforts of retailers.…”

Section: Model Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Previous research has demonstrated that market demand is significantly influenced by both the price of the product and the marketing efforts of retailers. Thus, the demand function is described as q = D − εp + δv in this paper [4,38,39]. Here, D represents the maximum market demand, while ε and δ represent the price sensitivity and market effort sensitivity of the consumer, respectively.…”

Section: Model Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Contracting Supply Chains Considering Retailers’ Marketing Efforts

Li,

He,

Shi

2024

Mathematics

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Strategic cooperation has garnered significant attention in business. In this study, we explored the operating mechanisms of supply chains utilizing three Stackelberg models, in the following ascending order of cooperation level: price only, marketing cost sharing, and cross-shareholding. Further, we investigated the impact of cooperation on prices, marketing efforts, and profits, and analyzed the strategic cooperation preferences of different supply chain members. The results show that the influence of the level of cooperation on the wholesale and selling price is nonlinear. Interestingly, increased levels of cooperation do not always result in better outcomes. The marketing cost-sharing strategy aggravates the marketing burden on retailers. In contrast, the cross-shareholding strategy not only increases the total marketing effort level, but also efficiently reduces the burden of marketing on retailers. Moreover, all cooperation strategies solely benefit manufacturers rather than retailers, and not all of them improve the supply chain’s performance. Finally, the cross-shareholding cooperation strategy only maximizes the consumer surplus and social welfare under certain conditions. Overall, our study describes the operational mechanisms of diverse cooperative strategies and provides managerial guidance for those seeking to enhance marketing efforts and economic and social performance using a cooperation strategy.

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Section: Marketingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Model Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Model Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Contracting Supply Chains Considering Retailers’ Marketing Efforts

Li,

He,

Shi

2024

Mathematics

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“…Based on the research achievements of a sales channel in a traditional supply chain [34][35][36], many scholars have studied the dual sales channel issues in CLSC. Regarding the problem of sales channel difference in a CLSC, Zheng et al [1] studied pricing, collection and coordination decisions of a dual-channel CLSC under different channel power structures, and exerted a two-part contract to coordinate the supply chain.…”

Section: Dual Sales Channel In Clscsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and Sales Effort Decisions in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering the Network Externality of Remanufactured Product

Li-jun

Huang

2023

Sustainability

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Considering the network externality of remanufactured product, this paper develops the Stackelberg game models in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a retailer with dual sales channel under three scenarios, i.e., no sales effort (Model N), the retailer exerting sales effort (Model R) and the OEM exerting sales effort (Model M). The study investigates the pricing and sales effort decisions for CLSC members. The results show that: (1) Compared with no sales effort, the sales effort behavior can always improve the profits of the OEM and entire CLSC. The retailer’s profit can be improved in Model R, so OEM exerting sales effort could cause a loss for the retailer and the sales effort behavior can promote the sales of remanufactured products and further cannibalize the new product market. (2) Model M is more favorable to improve the profits of the OEM and entire CLSC, while the retailer prefers Model R. Model M is more beneficial for boosting the sales of remanufactured products. (3) As the network externality/consumer’s sensitivity of sales effort becomes more obvious, CLSC members exert more sales effort, and the OEM exerts more sales effort compared to the retailer. (4) Only when the retailer’s sales effort cost is much lower than the OEM sales effort cost is it that OEM could obtain more profit when the retailer exerts sales effort; then, the win-win situation between OEM and the retailer is achieved.

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“…The market competition has gradually transformed into service competition, so the academic circles have discussed the service effort strategy. Duan et al (2021) introduced the fourth-party sales manager to analyze the impact of their sales effort on the supply chain. Chen et al (2017) discussed retailers' service effort effectiveness.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects and conflicts of co-opetition in a rail-water multimodal transport system

Liu

Wan

2023

Ann Oper Res

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This study investigates a rail-water multimodal transport system composed of a railway company, a liner company, and an emerging multi-modal operator. Based on the co-opetition game, we discuss decision strategy preference and conflict from a multi-stakeholder perspective to optimize individual profit and system efficiency. It is found that although the invasion of multi-modal operators into the market poses a threat to competition, their service effort directly affects the market demand and promotes the profits of each carrier. The free-riding and market expansion effects triggered by service effort interact with each other. However, multi-modal operators can cope with the negative impact of the free-riding effect through the service strategy and promote system efficiency optimization. Specifically, discussing each carrier's decision-making preferences for maximizing profits, we find that the multi-modal operators' strategy can achieve the Pareto optimal of triple-win, and the system efficiency is also optimal simultaneously.

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The impacts of sales efforts and mode of payment on the competition between agent and retailer

Cited by 22 publications

References 40 publications

Contracting Supply Chains Considering Retailers’ Marketing Efforts

Contracting Supply Chains Considering Retailers’ Marketing Efforts

Pricing and Sales Effort Decisions in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering the Network Externality of Remanufactured Product

The effects and conflicts of co-opetition in a rail-water multimodal transport system

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