The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem

Bobzien, Susanne

doi:10.1163/15685289860511069

Cited by 120 publications

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“…The eminent Bobzien, though, has argued that the contemporary problem of free will and physical determination emerged much later: It is then presumably only a slight overstatement when I conclude with saying: the problem of physical causal determinism and freedom of decision entered the scene in the 2nd century A.D., by a chance encounter of Stoic physics and the fruits of early Aristotle exegesis. (1998, 175) Either ay, it seems that Vihvelin is right to claim there is a traditional worry that deterministic causal laws, if they were to obtain, would preclude free will.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A critique of Vihvelin’s Three-fold Classification

Mickelson

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

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In this essay, I argue for the rejection of Vihvelin’s ‘Three-fold Classification’ (3-FC), a nonstandard taxonomy of free-will compatibilism, incompatibilism, and impossibilism. Vihvelin is right that the standard taxonomy of these views is inadequate, and that a new taxonomy is needed to clarify the free-will debate. Significantly, Vihvelin notes that the standard formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ does not capture the historically popular view that deterministic laws pose a threat to free will. Vihvelin’s proposed solution is to redefine ‘incompatibilism.’ However, Vihvelin’s formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ is flawed according to her own arguments. In addition, Vihvelin’s characterization of ‘compatibilism’ is (at best) incomplete, and at least two important free-will views are missing from her proposed taxonomy. Given the problems with Vihvelin’s arguments for 3-FC, her novel view of the dialectic between the major free-will views lacks support.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A critique of Vihvelin’s Three-fold Classification

Mickelson

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…9) For general discussion and defi nitions of these terms as used in religious studies and theology, see Bolle 1987. For Hellenistic defi nitions, see Moore 1929 andBobzien 1998a. For contemporary philosophic defi nitions that are infl uenced (but not determined) by the Hellenistic defi nitions, see Pink 2004.…”

Section: Fate Free Will and Compatibilism: A Preliminary Sketchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Josephus on Fate, Free Will, and Ancient Jewish Types of Compatibilism

Klawans

2009

Numen

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Recent scholarship on fate and free will in ancient Judaism is characterized by a lack of precision with regard to the nature of these disputes. Th ere is also some disagreement concerning the degree to which the disparate positions can be constructively compared with either Hellenistic philosophical approaches or later rabbinic theological ones. It is argued here that Josephus's brief typology of ancient Jewish disputes on this topic fi nds confi rmation in other ancient Jewish literature, especially the Wisdom of Ben Sira, the sectarian Dead Sea Scrolls, and later rabbinic literature. Yet it is imperative to nuance Josephus's typology so as to avoid imposing Hellenistic philosophical systems onto ancient Jewish theological ones. Th ese observations hold true especially when it comes to understanding the balance between fate and free will -the "compatibilism" -that characterizes the Pharisaic approach. It is rarely noticed that Josephus's accounts attribute to this group two distinct ways of balancing fate and free will. On the one hand, each of these two approaches fi nds distinct analogues within rabbinic literature, a fact that further confi rms both Josephus's reliability and the productivity of comparing his accounts with later rabbinic traditions. On the other hand, neither of the two types of compatibilism attributed by Josephus to the Pharisees can be identifi ed with Stoic compatibilism. Nonetheless, the term "compatibilism" remains the most appropriate term for distinguishing the Pharisaic compromises from the more extreme (but by no means uncomplicated) positions that seem to have characterized the Sadducees and Essenes in Josephus's day.

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“…A tese de Bobzien é que não há em Aristóteles uma preocupação com o problema do determinismo causal 43 . Aristóteles não sentiu necessidade de defender uma "liberdade para agir de outro modo sendo as circunstâncias as mesmas" e não ofereceu um tratamento "filosófico" da noção do "estar em nosso poder" (ela defende que é somente a partir de Alexandre de Afrodisia que surge o problema da liberdade, isto é, o problema de conciliar a liberdade para fazer de outro modo com a determinação causal proveniente da natureza ou do caráter) 44 . resultado da atividade de uma "faculdade da razão" capaz de agir "livremente" e alheia às demais circunstâncias (externas e internas) nas quais o agente está imerso.…”

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Aristóteles e o problema da responsabilidade moral: predeterminismo ou indeterminismo?/Aristotle and the Problem of Moral Responsibility: Pre-determinism or Indeterminism?

Andreazza

2015

PNS

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Quando discute os atos voluntários, em EN III 1-5, Aristóteles aborda duas questões: (i) sob que condições alguém pode ser moralmente responsabilizado por suas ações e (ii) quando alguém pode ser dito livre para executar suas ações. Aristóteles defende que podemos ser moralmente responsabilizado apenas se está em nosso poder agir e também não agir. O objetivo deste ensaio é analisar (i) e (ii), investigando se a noção “está em seu poder” é utilizada em um sentido indeterminista ou predeterminista por Aristóteles. Será defendido que há referências textuais para ambas as leituras, o que torna a questão insolúvel. Abstract: When discusses the voluntary acts, in EN III 1-5, Aristotle deals with two questions: (i) under which conditions someone can be morally responsible for his actions and (ii) when someone can be seen as free to act. Aristotle argues that we can be morally responsible only if is in our power to act and also it is in our power not to act. The aim of this essay is to analyze (i) and (ii), considering if the concept of “in our power” is used by Aristotle in an indeterminist or pre-determinist sense. It will be defended that there are textual references in favor of both interpretations, from which we can conclude that the question is unsolvable. Key words: Indeterminism. Predeterminism. Voluntary.

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The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem

Cited by 120 publications

References 0 publications

A critique of Vihvelin’s Three-fold Classification

A critique of Vihvelin’s Three-fold Classification

Josephus on Fate, Free Will, and Ancient Jewish Types of Compatibilism

Aristóteles e o problema da responsabilidade moral: predeterminismo ou indeterminismo?/Aristotle and the Problem of Moral Responsibility: Pre-determinism or Indeterminism?

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