The Individual Variability Problem

Gatzia, Dimitria Electra

doi:10.1007/s11406-009-9234-0

Cited by 3 publications

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References 37 publications

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“…postperceptual) judgement. As before, I see these aside as they are tangential to this discussion.25 Note thatGatzia (2010) also argues that Ecumenical Relationalists are precluded from accommodating colour illusions. She argues that Ecumenical Relationalists can only accommodate error via hallucination and via cognitions about perceptual experiences (e.g.…”

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confidence: 82%

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Colour variation without objective colour

Brown

2022

PhiMiSci

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Colour variation is the fact that what colour physical objects look to have depends on viewing conditions and a perceiver’s visual system. Both Colour Relationalists and Colour Eliminativists regard their analyses of colour variation as central to the justification for their respective views. Yet the analyses are decidedly different. Colour Relationalists assert that most instances of colour variation are veridical and infer from this that colours are relational properties of objects that are partly determined by perceivers. By contrast, Colour Eliminativists assert that colour variation is too unsystematic to ground the claim that many or most instances of colour variation are veridical. From this they infer that objects don’t have colours. I argue that the Eliminativist analysis is superior. On my view, the Relationalist account of veridical colour experience reduces to the assertion that objects have colour simply because they cause perceivers to have colour experiences of them. In this context, I argue, the resulting conception of veridicality is vacuous. More directly, the foundational idea of Eliminativism is the opposite claim: the fact that objects cause perceivers to have colour experiences of them is on its own not sufficient to justify or ground the claim that objects have colour. The Relationalist, I argue, has failed to justify anything stronger than this. In this debate we should thus side with the Eliminativist: objects do not possess colour; they merely cause us to undergo colour experiences.

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“…Two important strategies are dual-colour accounts Brown (2006) and fictionalism (e.g. Gatzia, 2010). A third dimension concerns the account of colour experience, and in particular the account of experiential error.…”

Section: Colour Eliminativism Primermentioning

confidence: 99%

Colour variation without objective colour

Brown

2022

PhiMiSci

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“… That being said, we can preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary color discourse by adopting a fictionalist version of eliminativism (see, e.g., Gatzia , 551–553).…”

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Metaphysics of Color 2: Non‐Physicalist Theories of Color

Logue

2016

Philosophy Compass

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This entry outlines relationalism, primitivism, and eliminativism about color and considers objections to each theory.This entry continues where 'Metaphysics of Color 1: Physicalist Theories of Color' left off. In that companion entry, I outlined physicalism about color -the view that color properties are identical to certain kinds of physical properties (e.g., surface spectral ref lectances). I evaluated physicalism with respect to the following desiderata on a metaphysics of color:• Structural desiderata: a metaphysics of color must accommodate certain structural claims about the colors (e.g., claims about similarities and differences). • The commonality desideratum: a color property must be identified with a (non-disjunctive)property that all things with that color have in common. • The ecumenism desideratum: color experiences of the same thing that vary across subjects and circumstances in certain ways are all veridical.As I said in the companion entry, physicalism can be regarded as a conservative theory of color, in the sense that it identifies colors with properties that all parties to the debate agree are actually instantiated by entities that appear to be colored. One of physicalism's main rivals, relationalism, is also a conservative theory. It holds that colors are properties that involve relations to psychological states of perceivers (such as being disposed to cause experiences of a certain kind). However, some have felt compelled to embrace radical theories, on which color properties are not identical to properties that pretty much everyone agrees are actually instantiated by entities that appear to be colored. Primitivism holds that colors are sui generis properties, over and above the physical and relational properties just mentioned, and eliminativism holds that external entities aren't actually colored after all. In this entry, I will outline and evaluate these alternatives to physicalism with respect to the desiderata mentioned above, as well as the following:• The causal desideratum: colors are the causes of color experiences.• The revelation desideratum: the natures of the colors are revealed by our experiences of them.

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Enhancing Student Understanding of Color Perception: A Teaching Activity on Intersubjective Color Variations

Gatzia

Einsporn

Ramsier

2017

The American Biology Teacher

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Introductory statistics textbooks rarely discuss the concept of variability for a categorical variable and thus, in this case, do not provide a measure of variability. The impression is thus given that there is no measurement of variability for a categorical variable.A measure of variability depends on the concept of variability. Research has shown that "unalikeability" is a more natural concept than "variation about the mean" for many students. A "coefficient of unalikeablity" can be used to measure this type of variability.Variability in categorical data is different from variability in quantitative data. This paper develops the coefficient of unalikeability as a measure of categorical variability.

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The Individual Variability Problem

Cited by 3 publications

References 37 publications

Colour variation without objective colour

Colour variation without objective colour

Metaphysics of Color 2: Non‐Physicalist Theories of Color

Enhancing Student Understanding of Color Perception: A Teaching Activity on Intersubjective Color Variations

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